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6166fffc422402db9f852496273d1608143206dfd4b75fea75b40e4a9e1f8a8f;;[{"layout":"detailed","uid":28210,"publicationDate":"29 Jun 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_183650.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPRjevfYGAe4I4tua3mCuHw=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Economics Chartbook - Downside risks to growth building (3Q22)","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"The Unicredit Economics Chartbook","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Global: <\/strong> GDP growth will probably slow to 3.0% this year (previously 3.3%) and 2.8% next year (from 3.4%). Headwinds from the Russia-Ukraine conflict have combined with COVID-19 lockdowns in China to push inflation up further and slow the pace of economic activity. Central banks have become even more hawkish. Tighter financial conditions, a squeeze in real incomes and a sharp downturn in consumer confidence will increasingly weigh on activity. Trade is weakening, also reflecting a switching of expenditure away from goods. Global inflation will probably peak soon, but the speed and extent of the subsequent decline remains highly uncertain. We think that central banks and markets are underestimating the downside risks to growth. If Russian energy imports suddenly stop, much of Europe will likely see negative GDP growth for 2023.<\/li><li><strong> US: <\/strong> We forecast GDP growth of 2.4% this year and below-potential growth of 1.3% next year. Economic momentum is slowing, particularly for interest-rate-sensitive sectors such as housing and durable goods. CPI inflation will likely peak at about 9% yoy in 3Q22, with monthly inflation prints likely easing to levels consistent with target by around the turn of the year. Longer-run measures of inflation expectations are still well anchored and average hourly earnings growth is moderating. We expect the Fed to raise the target range for the federal funds rate into restrictive territory by the end of the year, to 3.25-3.50%, which we see as the peak. Rate cuts could start in late 2023.<\/li><li><strong> Eurozone: <\/strong> GDP is likely to expand by 2.8% this year and by 1.3% in 2023. Survey indicators signal a weakening of growth momentum in the spring and downside risks for economic activity in 2H22. Headline and core inflation have further to rise, although we see initial signs that pipeline price pressure might start easing soon from extremely high levels. Weak growth and slowing inflation will probably force the ECB to stop hiking in 1Q23 once the depo rate reaches 1.25%, i.e. the lower end of the 1-2% range the central bank regards as 'neutral'. We expect the announcement of a credible anti-fragmentation facility featuring potentially unlimited purchases and light conditionality.<\/li><li><strong> CEE: <\/strong> The EU-CEE economies will likely grow on average by 3.6% in 2022 and 2.6% in 2023, with the Western Balkans lagging. Turkey could grow by 4.4% in 2022 and 3.3% in 2023. In Russia, the economy could shrink by around 10% this year and stall next year. Hungary and Slovakia would experience the biggest direct impact from a lack of Russian energy imports, followed by Bulgaria, Czechia and Serbia. Inflation is likely to peak this year in most CEE countries, except for Hungary and Poland, where the peak could be postponed to 2023. Inflation is expected to remain well above targets in 2023. We think that central banks will end rate hikes in the autumn, but the scope for rate cuts in 2023 is very limited. The CBR could cut the policy rate to 8% in 2022 and to 7% in 2023. The CBRT might hike in 2023 if there is a change in government.<\/li><li><strong> UK: <\/strong> We forecast GDP growth of 3.4% this year and 0.6% next year. The economy will be skating on the edge of recession for the next few quarters amid a big squeeze in real disposable income. Inflation is set to stay higher for longer in the UK compared to peers, peaking at above 9% yoy in 4Q22, but should fall quickly to below 2% by end-2023. The BoE will probably stop raising the bank rate after a final 25bp hike to 1.50% in August.<\/li><li><strong> China: <\/strong> GDP will likely grow by 4.0% in 2022 and by 4.2% in 2023. While most COVID-19-related restrictions were lifted at the beginning of June, the supply side of the economy is recovering faster than the demand side as Chinese consumers continue their cautious behavior to avoid quarantines. The central government is stepping up efforts to support the economy and reduce the negative impact of future waves of contagion on the domestic economy through a combination of monetary and fiscal policy measures. The PBoC might tolerate further weakening of the CNY towards 7.00 against the USD to support exports. <\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":"","hash":"6166fffc422402db9f852496273d1608143206dfd4b75fea75b40e4a9e1f8a8f","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"detailed","size":"default","showanalysts":"2","showcompanies":"2","showcountries":"2","showcurrencies":"2","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M y","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"300","synopsisexpand":"1","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"5"}},{"layout":"detailed","uid":28075,"publicationDate":"07 Jun 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_183480.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJCPfcVzTSO54AubO3iR-kKA=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - OPEC+ unlikely to deliver on its promises","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Last week, during its regular monthly review meeting, OPEC+ committed to increasing its July production quota by 648kb\/d instead of the expected 430kb\/d. With the oil market being extremely tight, the surprise extra-output was cheered by investors with a temporary drop in Brent and WTI prices that has already been more than reversed. Our Chart of the Week, which reports the gap between the promised OPEC+ output in July and what is likely achievable under current quotas and Western sanctions of Russian oil, shows that the production pledges made by the cartel are not realistic and that the market will continue to be heavily under-supplied at a time of resurging post-pandemic demand for oil. <\/li><li>OPEC+ lifted its overall production target for July to 43.2mb\/d from around 42.5mb\/d in June. The increase is split across the members of the cartel according to their quotas in the deal. However, the commitments clash with the reality on the ground. In order to meet the target, countries such as Algeria, Angola, Congo, Nigeria, Azerbaijan and a few others are supposed to produce above their sustainable capacity (production that can be activated within 90 days). Overall, they are expected to pump 900kb\/d more than what their fields allow to do. In addition, Russia is expected to increase its production by 600kb\/d. Unlike other members, Moscow has substantial spare capacity. But its output is already dropping as a result of Western sanctions, and it is expected to decline by 2mb\/d more between now and July, according to estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA). Overall, the market is likely to be short of 3.5mb\/d in July compared to what OPEC+ has promised (equivalent to 3.5% of pre-pandemic global supply). And the shortfall could be even higher if one considers that traditional producers are already producing below their official quotas due to logistical issues related to years of underinvestment. <\/li><li>Looking at traditional producers only, there are ways to mitigate the lack of supply. While most OPEC+ members are close to their production capacity, countries such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates could inject enough barrels of oil into the market to compensate for other producers\u00b4 shortfalls. For this to happen, the system of national quotas that underpins the current production deal would need to be scrapped. However, such a move would undermine the stability of the cartel itself, as many producers would see their output remaining the same while prices would go down. Alternatively, the West could allow sanctioned Iranian oil (at least 1.5mb\/d available) to enter global markets, possibly even without the signing of a new nuclear deal, albeit not easy to implement and not enough to offset the gap in OPEC+ production.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":"","analysts":[{"first":"Edoardo","last":"Campanella","link":"https:\/\/www.unicreditresearch.eu\/index.php?id=analyst&tx_research_piedition%5Banalyst%5D=21&tx_research_piedition%5Baction%5D=analyst&tx_research_piedition%5Bcontroller%5D=Edition&cHash=74c2d76d6c9952be40cf5647d027b739"}]},{"layout":"detailed","uid":28041,"publicationDate":"01 Jun 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_183443.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJCPfcVzTSO54s1-MbFJDJiQ=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_183453.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJCPfcVzTSO54F6Cn9ac9boI=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_183467.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJCPfcVzTSO54pMappIm8ttA=&T=1&T=1"},"title":"Oil Update - Oil prices likely to stay high for long","titleDe":"Oil Update - \u00d6lpreise werden wahrscheinlich noch lange hoch bleiben","titleIt":"Oil Update - Il prezzo del petrolio potrebbe rimanere alto a lungo","product":"Oil Update","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>The oil market remains extremely tight. Sanctions on Russian oil, OPEC+ production constraints and the stalled negotiations for an Iranian nuclear deal are likely to prolong the market tightness at a time of resurging post-pandemic mobility. <\/li><li>Only the scrapping of OPEC+ quotas and the signing of an Iran deal would bring lasting price relief to the market. However, neither scenario looks politically realistic ' at least for the moment. <\/li><li>Upside risks to our forecast of oil prices declining in 2H22 towards USD 110\/bbl have increased substantially. Brent might remain in the USD 115-125\/bbl trading range for longer than originally expected, with potential spikes to USD 130\/bbl.Brent is again hovering around USD 120\/bbl. The easing of anti-virus lockdowns in China, along with the partial embargo of Russian oil that was just announced by the European Union, has pushed oil prices to a two month-high. These factors add to the tightness of an already tight oil market (Chart 1). The expected shift from a situation of under-supply to one of over-supply by mid-year is now becoming increasingly unlikely ' and not just because of the uncertainty caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In its latest Short-Term Energy Outlook, the Energy Information Agency predicted that the oil market would remain broadly balanced for the next few months, but that supply would no longer exceed demand as it was forecasting until a couple of months ago. However, as we discuss below, this is a rather optimistic assumption at the moment.Even if the degree of uncertainty remains extraordinarily high and there are several mitigating factors at play, such a tight market implies that upside risks to our forecast of oil prices declining in 2H22 towards USD 110\/bbl have increased substantially. Regardless of mandated and voluntary sanctions on Russian oil, actual supply from OPEC+ producers is substantially lower than formal production commitments would suggest as a result of years of underinvestment and poor maintenance of existing infrastructure. Exempting Russia from the OPEC+ output deal and allowing other producers such as Saudi Arabia to pump more might bring some temporary relief to the market, but the lack of sufficient spare capacity represents an increasingly binding constraint at a time of resurging post-pandemic mobility. As a result, the probability of Brent remaining in the USD 115-125\/bbl trading range for longer than originally expected, at least throughout the summer, has increased considerably, with potential spikes to USD 130\/bbl.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"\u00dcbersetzung der englischen Originalversion vom 01. Juni 2022<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Der \u00d6lmarkt ist nach wie vor extrem angespannt. Die Sanktionen gegen russisches \u00d6l, die Produktionsbeschr\u00e4nkungen der OPEC+ und die ins Stocken geratenen Verhandlungen \u00fcber ein iranisches Nuklearabkommen werden die Anspannung des Marktes in einer Zeit wiederauflebender Mobilit\u00e4t nach der Pandemie wahrscheinlich verl\u00e4ngern. <\/li><li> Nur die Aufhebung der OPEC+-Quoten und die Unterzeichnung eines Iran-Abkommens w\u00fcrden eine dauerhafte Preisentlastung auf dem Markt bringen. Keines der beiden Szenarien erscheint jedoch politisch realistisch - zumindest f\u00fcr den Moment. <\/li><li> Die Aufw\u00e4rtsrisiken f\u00fcr unsere Prognose, dass die \u00d6lpreise in 2H22 auf 110 USD\/bbl sinken werden, haben erheblich zugenommen. Brent k\u00f6nnte l\u00e4nger als urspr\u00fcnglich erwartet in der Handelsspanne von 115-125 USD\/bbl verbleiben, mit m\u00f6glichen Ausschl\u00e4gen bis 130 USD\/bbl.Brent schwankt wieder um 120 USD\/bbl. Die Lockerung der Coronabeschr\u00e4nkungen in China und das gerade von der Europ\u00e4ischen Union angek\u00fcndigte Teilembargo f\u00fcr russisches \u00d6l haben die \u00d6lpreise auf ein Zweimonatshoch getrieben. Diese Faktoren tragen dazu bei, dass der ohnehin schon angespannte \u00d6lmarkt noch enger wird (Grafik 1). Der f\u00fcr Mitte des Jahres erwartete \u00dcbergang von einer Unterversorgung zu einem \u00dcberangebot wird nun immer unwahrscheinlicher - und das nicht nur wegen der durch den Russland-Ukraine-Konflikt verursachten Unsicherheiten. In ihrem j\u00fcngsten Ausblick prognostiziert die Energy Information Agency, dass der \u00d6lmarkt in den n\u00e4chsten Monaten weitgehend ausgeglichen bleiben wird, dass aber das Angebot die Nachfrage nicht mehr \u00fcbersteigen wird, wie noch vor einigen Monaten vorhergesagt. Wie wir weiter unten er\u00f6rtern, ist dies jedoch derzeit eine eher optimistische Annahme.Auch wenn die Unsicherheit nach wie vor au\u00dferordentlich hoch ist und mehrere abmildernde Faktoren eine Rolle spielen, bedeutet ein derart angespannter Markt, dass die Aufw\u00e4rtsrisiken f\u00fcr unsere Prognose eines \u00d6lpreisr\u00fcckgangs in 2H22 in Richtung 110 USD\/bbl erheblich gestiegen sind. Ungeachtet der verordneten und freiwilligen Sanktionen gegen russisches \u00d6l ist das tats\u00e4chliche Angebot der OPEC+-Produzenten wesentlich geringer, als es die formalen Produktionsverpflichtungen vermuten lassen w\u00fcrden, da jahrelang zu wenig investiert und die bestehende Infrastruktur schlecht gewartet wurde. Die Freistellung Russlands von der OPEC+-Produktionsvereinbarung und die Erlaubnis f\u00fcr andere Produzenten wie Saudi-Arabien, mehr zu produzieren, k\u00f6nnte den Markt vor\u00fcbergehend etwas entlasten, aber das Fehlen ausreichender Kapazit\u00e4tsreserven stellt in einer Zeit wiederauflebender Mobilit\u00e4t nach einer Pandemie eine zunehmende Einschr\u00e4nkung dar. Infolgedessen ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Brent l\u00e4nger als urspr\u00fcnglich erwartet in der Handelsspanne von 115-125 USD\/bbl verbleibt, zumindest w\u00e4hrend des Sommers, erheblich gestiegen, wobei ein Anstieg auf 130 USD\/bbl m\u00f6glich ist.GRAFIK 1. EIN UNTERVERSORGTER MARKT<\/li><\/ul>","synopsisIt":"Traduzione della versione originale inglese del 1 giugno 2022<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Il mercato del petrolio rimane estremamente rigido. Le sanzioni sul petrolio russo, i vincoli di produzione dell\u00b4OPEC+ e lo stallo dei negoziati per l\u00b4accordo sul nucleare iraniano probabilmente prolungheranno la rigidit\u00e0 del mercato in un momento di ripresa della mobilit\u00e0 post-pandemica. <\/li><li> Solo l\u00b4abolizione delle quote OPEC+ e la firma di un accordo con l\u00b4Iran porterebbero un sollievo duraturo ai prezzi del mercato. Tuttavia, nessuno dei due scenari sembra politicamente realistico, almeno per il momento. <\/li><li> I rischi di rialzo per la nostra previsione di un calo dei prezzi del petrolio nel secondo semestre del 2012 verso i 110 dollari al barile sono aumentati in modo sostanziale. Il Brent potrebbe rimanere nella fascia di negoziazione 115-125 USD\/bbl pi\u00f9 a lungo di quanto inizialmente previsto, con potenziali picchi a 130 USD\/bbl.<\/li><\/ul>","analysts":[{"first":"Edoardo","last":"Campanella","link":"https:\/\/www.unicreditresearch.eu\/index.php?id=analyst&tx_research_piedition%5Banalyst%5D=21&tx_research_piedition%5Baction%5D=analyst&tx_research_piedition%5Bcontroller%5D=Edition&cHash=74c2d76d6c9952be40cf5647d027b739"}],"countries":[{"name":"Global","ticker":"","link":"https:\/\/www.unicreditresearch.eu\/index.php?id=country&tx_research_piedition%5Bcountry%5D=33&tx_research_piedition%5Baction%5D=country&tx_research_piedition%5Bcontroller%5D=Edition&cHash=4c1b220737febcefc785f67dbe920bab"}]},{"layout":"detailed","uid":27911,"publicationDate":"12 May 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_183276.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJJAYtfRRuP-QMG6KcSzQklc=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - US consumers only slowly normalizing their spending patterns","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The expenditure-switching caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to the high inflationary pressure over the last year. Lockdowns and social distancing shifted consumer demand away from services and towards goods ' a shift in spending that was further reinforced by the increase in disposable income resulting from generous fiscal transfers. The rise in demand for goods was too abrupt for already constrained supply to adjust in time, thus pushing prices higher, while services firms facing reduced demand did not cut prices to the same extent as it would have done little to improve demand, leaving overall inflation higher. In other words, the sectoral Philips Curve was non-linear.<\/li><li> Our Chart of the Week shows that, despite the full reopening of the US economy, demand anomalies persist. The chart shows US personal consumption expenditure adjusted for inflation, using December 2019 as the baseline. Real consumer spending on both durable and non-durable goods remains around 10% and 20% higher, respectively, than before the pandemic ' with just marginal easing over the last nine months as prices rose steeply and the economy continued to reopen. Spending on services has now returned to pre-crisis levels but there are many categories that are still a long way away from their end-2019 levels. While real spending on accommodation is now back to roughly where it was two-and-a-half years ago, spending on recreational activities, travelling abroad and public transportation remains muted. <\/li><li> High goods price inflation, pent-up demand for travel-related services and a further easing of the direct effects of the pandemic will likely lead to further normalization of consumer spending patterns. But the adjustment process might be more gradual than originally thought with implications also for the re-allocation of labor across sectors, for spare capacity in the labor market and ultimately for the monetary policy stance itself. Continuing COVID-related bureaucratic burdens, such as testing for travelling or capacity constraints for public events, are weighing on demand for certain services. And in some cases, the change in consumption habits might be longer lasting. The spread of remote work, for example, is likely to continue to affect demand for public transportation and the consumption of food away from home, whereas new recreational habits might persist either for fear of contagion or because of structural changes in preferences.<\/li><li> The implication for overall inflation will depend on the balance between moderating core goods inflation on the one hand, and rising core services inflation on the other. The rebalancing of spending towards services could help ease overall inflation if the sectoral Phillips Curve continues to be non-linear. However, core goods inflation could prove stubbornly high amid ongoing supply bottlenecks for goods caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict and COVID-19-related lockdowns in China, while rising core services inflation is likely to be reinforced by the tight labor market.<\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":"","analysts":[{"first":"Edoardo","last":"Campanella","link":"https:\/\/www.unicreditresearch.eu\/index.php?id=analyst&tx_research_piedition%5Banalyst%5D=21&tx_research_piedition%5Baction%5D=analyst&tx_research_piedition%5Bcontroller%5D=Edition&cHash=74c2d76d6c9952be40cf5647d027b739"}],"countries":[{"name":"United States","ticker":"US","link":"https:\/\/www.unicreditresearch.eu\/index.php?id=country&tx_research_piedition%5Bcountry%5D=42&tx_research_piedition%5Baction%5D=country&tx_research_piedition%5Bcontroller%5D=Edition&cHash=7bc8e05d14fb73ad6fbafeda31d249b7"}]},{"layout":"detailed","uid":27905,"publicationDate":"11 May 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_183269.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJJAYtfRRuP-QVfQrwOMK2Ec=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Data Comment - US CPI: core services inflation picks up ","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"Data Comment","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> All-item CPI inflation decelerated to 8.3% yoy in April, down from 8.5% yoy in March, whereas core inflation eased to 6.2% yoy from 6.5% yoy. Looking at monthly changes, instead, the picture is more blurred. Headline inflation eased to 0.3% mom in April from 1.2% in March, thanks primarily to a decline in energy prices, whereas core inflation accelerated to 0.6% mom from 0.3% mom in the prior month. <\/li><li> Shelter, food, airfares, and new vehicles were the largest contributors to the monthly increase in CPI. Airfares, in particular, increased by a whopping 18.6% mom after a rise of 10.6% in the prior month. There are likely two reasons for the jump in airfares in April. First, ongoing expenditure-switching away from goods and towards services as the direct effects of the pandemic fade has pushed up prices for travel-related items. This is likely to last at least a few more months as pent-up demand for travel is absorbed. Second, the later timing of Easter this year compared to last year probably temporarily inflated airfares in April. When it comes to shelter, rents surged 0.6% mom and Owners\u00b4 Equivalent Rent (OER) was up 0.5% mom, a very strong pace. Considering that rents and OER tend to be sticky, and together they account for 31% of the CPI basket and 40% of the core CPI one, it will likely continue to remain a key driver of inflation going forward. <\/li><li> Core goods prices are showing some signs of easing (apparel -0.8% mom, used cars -0.4% mom, appliances -0.5% mom), but new vehicle prices (1.1% mom) were up strongly as supply bottlenecks continue and might intensify in the coming months as a result of negative spillovers from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and anti-COVID restrictions adopted in China. <\/li><li> All in all, today\u00b4s inflation report provides two key messages. First, energy-related inflation is losing steam as oil prices are stabilizing, albeit at high levels. Second, the lifting of restrictions and the reopening of the economy are being accompanied by a normalization in spending patterns, away from goods towards services. Consequently, core goods inflation is now moderating, while core services inflation is accelerating. The challenge facing the Fed in bringing inflation down towards the target is highlighted by the following. Rents and OER alone are currently contributing 0.2pp to monthly core inflation, and this is likely to continue for some time. It means that for monthly core inflation to moderate towards target-consistent levels, core goods inflation would likely have to turn negative (not only moderate, as it is now) in order to offset rising core services inflation driven by expenditure-switching and a very tight labor market. Therefore, today\u00b4s CPI report will give the Fed more reason to continue with its tightening plans. In greater detail,Both headline and core CPI inflation likely peaked in March in year-on-year terms (chart 1) but, for the time being, the 2% inflation target remain elusive for the Fed with monthly core CPI inflation accelerating. Consequently, the descent from a 40-year high for year-on-year inflation is likely to be slow. CHART 1. INFLATION HAS PEAKED IN ANNUAL TERMS<\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":"","analysts":[{"first":"Edoardo","last":"Campanella","link":"https:\/\/www.unicreditresearch.eu\/index.php?id=analyst&tx_research_piedition%5Banalyst%5D=21&tx_research_piedition%5Baction%5D=analyst&tx_research_piedition%5Bcontroller%5D=Edition&cHash=74c2d76d6c9952be40cf5647d027b739"}],"countries":[{"name":"United States","ticker":"US","link":"https:\/\/www.unicreditresearch.eu\/index.php?id=country&tx_research_piedition%5Bcountry%5D=42&tx_research_piedition%5Baction%5D=country&tx_research_piedition%5Bcontroller%5D=Edition&cHash=7bc8e05d14fb73ad6fbafeda31d249b7"}]}]

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Edoardo Campanella
Economist
UniCredit Bank AG, Milan
Piazza Gae Aulenti, 4 - Tower C -
I-20154 Milan
Italy
+39 02 8862-0522

Edoardo Campanella is an economist on the UniCredit Research team. His daily activity is mainly focused on macroeconomic developments taking place in the eurozone. He previously worked as an econom...

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