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d60f69f8f9239602114dc51c5a65199ea51b2fc6e6b15abe1e29b1549dd25a9c;;[{"layout":"detailed","uid":28210,"publicationDate":"29 Jun 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_183650.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPRjevfYGAe4I4tua3mCuHw=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Economics Chartbook - Downside risks to growth building (3Q22)","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"The Unicredit Economics Chartbook","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Global: <\/strong> GDP growth will probably slow to 3.0% this year (previously 3.3%) and 2.8% next year (from 3.4%). Headwinds from the Russia-Ukraine conflict have combined with COVID-19 lockdowns in China to push inflation up further and slow the pace of economic activity. Central banks have become even more hawkish. Tighter financial conditions, a squeeze in real incomes and a sharp downturn in consumer confidence will increasingly weigh on activity. Trade is weakening, also reflecting a switching of expenditure away from goods. Global inflation will probably peak soon, but the speed and extent of the subsequent decline remains highly uncertain. We think that central banks and markets are underestimating the downside risks to growth. If Russian energy imports suddenly stop, much of Europe will likely see negative GDP growth for 2023.<\/li><li><strong> US: <\/strong> We forecast GDP growth of 2.4% this year and below-potential growth of 1.3% next year. Economic momentum is slowing, particularly for interest-rate-sensitive sectors such as housing and durable goods. CPI inflation will likely peak at about 9% yoy in 3Q22, with monthly inflation prints likely easing to levels consistent with target by around the turn of the year. Longer-run measures of inflation expectations are still well anchored and average hourly earnings growth is moderating. We expect the Fed to raise the target range for the federal funds rate into restrictive territory by the end of the year, to 3.25-3.50%, which we see as the peak. Rate cuts could start in late 2023.<\/li><li><strong> Eurozone: <\/strong> GDP is likely to expand by 2.8% this year and by 1.3% in 2023. Survey indicators signal a weakening of growth momentum in the spring and downside risks for economic activity in 2H22. Headline and core inflation have further to rise, although we see initial signs that pipeline price pressure might start easing soon from extremely high levels. Weak growth and slowing inflation will probably force the ECB to stop hiking in 1Q23 once the depo rate reaches 1.25%, i.e. the lower end of the 1-2% range the central bank regards as 'neutral'. We expect the announcement of a credible anti-fragmentation facility featuring potentially unlimited purchases and light conditionality.<\/li><li><strong> CEE: <\/strong> The EU-CEE economies will likely grow on average by 3.6% in 2022 and 2.6% in 2023, with the Western Balkans lagging. Turkey could grow by 4.4% in 2022 and 3.3% in 2023. In Russia, the economy could shrink by around 10% this year and stall next year. Hungary and Slovakia would experience the biggest direct impact from a lack of Russian energy imports, followed by Bulgaria, Czechia and Serbia. Inflation is likely to peak this year in most CEE countries, except for Hungary and Poland, where the peak could be postponed to 2023. Inflation is expected to remain well above targets in 2023. We think that central banks will end rate hikes in the autumn, but the scope for rate cuts in 2023 is very limited. The CBR could cut the policy rate to 8% in 2022 and to 7% in 2023. The CBRT might hike in 2023 if there is a change in government.<\/li><li><strong> UK: <\/strong> We forecast GDP growth of 3.4% this year and 0.6% next year. The economy will be skating on the edge of recession for the next few quarters amid a big squeeze in real disposable income. Inflation is set to stay higher for longer in the UK compared to peers, peaking at above 9% yoy in 4Q22, but should fall quickly to below 2% by end-2023. The BoE will probably stop raising the bank rate after a final 25bp hike to 1.50% in August.<\/li><li><strong> China: <\/strong> GDP will likely grow by 4.0% in 2022 and by 4.2% in 2023. While most COVID-19-related restrictions were lifted at the beginning of June, the supply side of the economy is recovering faster than the demand side as Chinese consumers continue their cautious behavior to avoid quarantines. The central government is stepping up efforts to support the economy and reduce the negative impact of future waves of contagion on the domestic economy through a combination of monetary and fiscal policy measures. The PBoC might tolerate further weakening of the CNY towards 7.00 against the USD to support exports. <\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":"","hash":"d60f69f8f9239602114dc51c5a65199ea51b2fc6e6b15abe1e29b1549dd25a9c","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"detailed","size":"default","showanalysts":"2","showcompanies":"2","showcountries":"2","showcurrencies":"2","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M y","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"300","synopsisexpand":"1","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"5"}},{"layout":"detailed","uid":27589,"publicationDate":"30 Mar 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2022_182907.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRooLgAZTPWCLUSnFz7GhBRew==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2022_183204.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRowzPsxhSxJZfjfaWjJHQarQ==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - Turmoil in Europe: The impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on CEE (2Q22)","titleDe":"CEE Quarterly - Unruhen in Europa: Die Auswirkungen des Russland-Ukraine-Konflikts auf die CEE-Region","titleIt":"","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Russia\u00b4s invasion of Ukraine could be a watershed moment for Europe\u00b4s political and economic landscape.<\/li><li> Comprehensive sanctions could affect CEE\u00b4s trade with Russia and also domestic sectors in which Russian investment is important, such as energy and metals. Sanctions are already leading to higher commodity prices and lower commodity imports from Russia<\/li><li> Russian countersanctions and other measures are likely to impact CEE through the ban on food exports (with Turkey hardest hit), RUB payments for Russian gas (with the Balkans the most at risk), potential spillovers on risk appetite from Russia\u00b4s capital controls.<\/li><li> If Russia continues to export oil and gas to Europe, we expect its economy to shrink by around 12% this year (peak-to-trough of around 20%), with a muted rebound in 2023 akin to stagnation. In EU-CEE1) and in the Western Balkans, GDP is expected to grow by around 2.3% in 2022 and by 3.6% in 2023. The direct impact of the conflict on GDP growth is estimated at 1.5-3pp in 2022 and up to 1.5pp in 2023. Turkey could grow by around 4% this year and 3.8% in 2023.<\/li><li>We expect CEE to gradually reduce its dependency on Russian hydrocarbons with help from NextGenerationEU (NGEU). CEE governments might help households and companies weather higher commodity prices by incurring larger budget deficits. However, a new common EU fund might be needed to fight rapid price increases.<\/li><li>If the EU stops importing oil and gas from Russia, the Russian economy could shrink by around 20% this year and fail to rebound in 2023. In such a scenario, EU-CEE and the Western Balkans would probably fall into recession.<\/li><li>Inflation could reach 30-year highs due to rapidly rising commodity and food prices, and supply-chain bottlenecks. We expect inflation to end this year at or above 10% in Central Europe, at around 35% in Russia and at close to 60% in Turkey. Inflation targets could be missed again in 2023 amid persistent supply shocks.<\/li><li>We expect rates to be hiked to 6% in Hungary and Poland, 4.75% in Czechia, 4% in Romania and 2% in Serbia. Central banks are likely to intervene in FX markets to avoid depreciation above EUR-HUF 380, EUR-PLN 4.80 and EUR-RON 5.00 (with the NBR probably relaxing this stance if the conflict in Ukraine ends). <\/li><li>Liquidity management and FX interventions could keep interbank interest rates above 5% and push forward implied interest rates into double digits in times of stress. Thus, we see little scope for positioning against CEE currencies, especially in Romania and Serbia. <\/li><li>In our view, the main political consequences of the conflict in Ukraine are the following: 1. Russia is likely to drift further away from the West, both economically and politically; 2. Relations between Turkey and NATO are likely to improve; 3. Poland could become more engaged in European affairs and regional politics, moving closer to the EU. NGEU money could be unblocked for both Poland and Hungary; 4. Hungary could become more isolated in the EU and in the Visegrad group; 5. Serbia might be forced to choose between the EU and Russia; 6. The EU could increase its involvement in the political crisis affecting Bosnia-Herzegovina; 7. Economic shocks might fuel political instability in Slovenia and Romania; 8. Despite support from EU-CEE, Ukraine is unlikely to become an EU member any time soon.1) EU-CEE refers to CEE countries that are members of the EU: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>\u00dcbersetzung der englischen Originalversion vom 30. M\u00e4rz 2022<\/p><\/p><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Der Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine k\u00f6nnte einen Wendepunkt in der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Landschaft Europas darstellen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Umfassende Sanktionen d\u00fcrften sich auf den Handel der CEE-L\u00e4nder mit Russland und auch auf inl\u00e4ndische Sektoren auswirken, in denen russische Investitionen wichtig sind, wie etwa Energie und Metalle. Die Sanktionen f\u00fchren bereits zu h\u00f6heren Rohstoffpreisen und geringeren Rohstoffimporten aus Russland.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Russische Gegensanktionen und andere Ma\u00dfnahmen werden sich m\u00f6glicherweise auch auf die CEE-L\u00e4nder auswirken, und zwar durch das Verbot von Lebensmittelexporten (wobei die T\u00fcrkei am st\u00e4rksten betroffen ist), durch RUB-Zahlungen f\u00fcr russisches Gas (wobei die Balkanl\u00e4nder am st\u00e4rksten gef\u00e4hrdet sind) und durch potenzielle Auswirkungen auf die Risikobereitschaft aufgrund der russischen Kapitalverkehrskontrollen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wenn Russland weiterhin Erd\u00f6l und Gas nach Europa exportiert, erwarten wir, dass die russische Wirtschaft in diesem Jahr um etwa 12% zur\u00fcckgehen wird (vom H\u00f6chst- zum Tiefststand um etwa 20%), mit einem ged\u00e4mpften Aufschwung im Jahr 2023, der einer Stagnation gleichkommt. In der EU-CEE-Region1) und in den westlichen Balkanl\u00e4ndern d\u00fcrfte das BIP im Jahr 2022 um etwa 2,3% und im Jahr 2023 um 3,6% wachsen. Die direkten Auswirkungen des Konflikts auf das BIP-Wachstum werden auf 1,5 bis 3 Prozentpunkte im Jahr 2022 und bis zu 1,5 Prozentpunkte im Jahr 2023 gesch\u00e4tzt. Die T\u00fcrkei k\u00f6nnte in diesem Jahr um rund 4% und 2023 um 3,8% wachsen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wir erwarten, dass die CEE-L\u00e4nder ihre Abh\u00e4ngigkeit von russischen fossilen Energierohstoffen mit Hilfe des Next Generation EU-Programms (NGEU) schrittweise verringern werden. Die Regierungen der CEE-L\u00e4nder helfen m\u00f6glicherweise den Haushalten und Unternehmen, h\u00f6here Rohstoffpreise zu verkraften, indem sie gr\u00f6\u00dfere Haushaltsdefizite einfahren. Allerdings k\u00f6nnte ein neuer gemeinsamer EU-Fonds erforderlich sein, um den raschen Preisanstieg zu bek\u00e4mpfen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wenn die EU ihre Erd\u00f6l- und Gasimporte aus Russland einstellt, k\u00f6nnte die russische Wirtschaft in diesem Jahr um rund 20% zur\u00fcckgehen und sich bis 2023 nicht erholen. In einem solchen Szenario w\u00fcrden die EU, die CEE-Staaten und der westliche Balkan voraussichtlich in eine Rezession fallen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die Inflation erreicht vermutlich aufgrund rasch steigender Rohstoff- und Lebensmittelpreise sowie Engp\u00e4ssen in der Versorgungskette den h\u00f6chsten Stand seit 30 Jahren. Wir erwarten, dass die Inflation in diesem Jahr in Mitteleuropa bei oder \u00fcber 10%, in Russland bei etwa 35% und in der T\u00fcrkei bei fast 60% liegen wird. Aufgrund anhaltender Angebotsschocks k\u00f6nnten die Inflationsziele im Jahr 2023 erneut verfehlt werden.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wir gehen davon aus, dass die Zinss\u00e4tze in Ungarn und Polen auf 6%, in der Tschechischen Republik auf 4,75%, in Rum\u00e4nien auf 4% und in Serbien auf 2% angehoben werden. Die Zentralbanken werden wahrscheinlich an den Devisenm\u00e4rkten intervenieren, um eine Abwertung \u00fcber EUR-HUF 380, EUR-PLN 4,80 und EUR-RON 5,00 zu vermeiden (wobei die NBR diese Haltung eventuell lockert, wenn der Konflikt in der Ukraine endet). <\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Ma\u00dfnahmen zum Liquidit\u00e4tsmanagement und Devisenmarktinterventionen k\u00f6nnten die Interbankenzinsen \u00fcber 5% halten und die impliziten Forward-Zinsen in Stresssituationen in den zweistelligen Bereich treiben. Daher sehen wir wenig Spielraum f\u00fcr eine Positionierung gegen\u00fcber den CEE-W\u00e4hrungen, insbesondere in Rum\u00e4nien und Serbien.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>1) EU-CEE bezieht sich auf die CEE-L\u00e4nder, die Mitglied der EU sind: Bulgarien, Kroatien, Polen, Rum\u00e4nien, die Slowakei, Slowenien, Tschechien und Ungarn.<\/p><\/p>","synopsisIt":""},{"layout":"detailed","uid":26972,"publicationDate":"12 Jan 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2022_182106.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRovGugTmeT3deYYaT_MxLfNw==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2022_182331.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRodA5f6kEwXCvyY-78mjGyCQ==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - Recovery amid supply-chain and (geo)political risks (1Q22)","titleDe":"CEE Quarterly - Erholung inmitten von Risiken bei Lieferketten und (Geo)politik (1Q22)","titleIt":"","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect the economies in EU-CEE 1) and in the Western Balkans to grow by around 4.0% in 2022 and by 4.4% in 2023, slowing from 5.1% in 2021. Pent-up consumer demand is expected to drive the recovery in 1H22, while capex and exports could be underpinned by fewer supply-chain disruptions in 2H22 and 2023. Grants and loans from NextGeneration EU (NGEU) will support public investment in 2022-23.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Economic activity in all of these countries will likely return to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2022, but not to the pre-pandemic growth trend.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In Turkey, we expect economic growth of 4.7% in 2022 and of 4.1% in 2023, although risks to financial stability could undermine the positive effects of rate cuts.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The Russian economy could grow by around 2.2% annually in 2022-23, returning close to potential as household incomes grow at a slower pace and the credit impulse turns negative. Planned transfers from the National Wealth Fund might fuel public investment.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Inflation is likely to miss targets in 2022 as supply shocks could be larger and longer lasting than in Western Europe. Disinflation might be slowed by tight labor markets in Central Europe, where 2023 inflation targets are also threatened.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Policy rates could be increased in 1H22 to 3% in Hungary and Romania, to 3.5% in Poland and to 4.5% in Czechia. The NBS could increase the key rate to 2% before year-end. The NBH, the NBR and the NBS might deliver additional tightening through liquidity management and FX interventions. Only the CNB is expected to cut 25bp before the end of 2022.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Real policy rates could be kept low due to expected fiscal tightening in 2022 and the loss of households\u00b4 purchasing power amid supply shocks. Prudential measures will tighten financial conditions where credit to households continues to rise at a fast pace.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The CBRT and the CBR are likely to cut in 2022, but financial conditions could tighten in Turkey if USD-TRY surges further. We expect the CBR to take the policy rate to 5% by 2023, while, in Turkey, we expect a sharp reversal of rate cuts.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In our view, the main (geo)political risks in 2022 stem from the stand-off between the EU and Hungary and Poland; tight parliamentary elections in Hungary; the migrant crisis at the eastern border of the EU; ethnic tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina; fragile governing coalitions in Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey; potential sanctions on Russia; gas deliveries to Europe and social unrest amid high energy and food prices. 1) EU-CEE refers to CEE countries that are members of the EU: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>\u00dcbersetzung der englischen Originalversion vom 12. Januar 2022<\/p><\/p><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wir gehen davon aus, dass die Volkswirtschaften in der EU-CEE-Region und im Westbalkan im Jahr 2022 um etwa 4,0% und 2023 um 4,4% wachsen werden, was einer Abschw\u00e4chung von einem Wachstum von 5,1% im Jahr 2021 entspricht. Die aufgestaute Verbrauchernachfrage d\u00fcrfte den Aufschwung im 1H22 vorantreiben, w\u00e4hrend die Investitionen und Exporte durch nachlassende Effekt aus den Unterbrechungen der Lieferketten im 2H22 und 2023 gest\u00fctzt werden k\u00f6nnten. Zusch\u00fcsse und Darlehen aus dem NGEU-Programm werden die \u00f6ffentlichen Investitionen in den Jahren 2022-23 unterst\u00fctzen. <\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In all diesen L\u00e4ndern wird die Wirtschaftst\u00e4tigkeit bis Ende 2022 wahrscheinlich wieder das Niveau, aber nicht den Wachstumstrend vor der Pandemie erreichen. <\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In der T\u00fcrkei erwarten wir ein Wirtschaftswachstum von 4,7% im Jahr 2022 und von 4,1% im Jahr 2023, obwohl Risiken f\u00fcr die Finanzstabilit\u00e4t die positiven Auswirkungen der Zinssenkungen untergraben k\u00f6nnten. <\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die russische Wirtschaft k\u00f6nnte 2022-23 j\u00e4hrlich um etwa 2,2% wachsen und damit in die N\u00e4he ihres Potenzials zur\u00fcckkehren, wobei die Haushaltseinkommen langsamer wachsen und der Kreditimpuls negativ werden d\u00fcrfte. Die geplanten Transfers aus dem Nationalen Wohlstandsfonds sollten die \u00f6ffentlichen Investitionen ankurbeln. <\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die Inflation wird ihre Ziele 2022 wahrscheinlich verfehlen, da die Angebotsschocks gr\u00f6\u00dfer und l\u00e4nger anhaltend sein k\u00f6nnten als in Westeuropa. Der R\u00fcckgang der Inflationsraten k\u00f6nnte durch angespannte Arbeitsm\u00e4rkte in Mitteleuropa gebremst werden, wo die Inflationsziele f\u00fcr 2023 ebenfalls gef\u00e4hrdet sind.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die Leitzinsen d\u00fcrften im 1H22 in Ungarn und Rum\u00e4nien auf 3%, in Polen auf 3,5% und in der Tschechischen Republik auf 4,5% angehoben werden. Die NBS wird den Leitzins vor Jahresende vermutlich auf 2% anheben. Die NBH, die NBR und die NBS k\u00f6nnten durch Liquidit\u00e4tsmanagement und Devisenmarktinterventionen eine zus\u00e4tzliche Straffung vornehmen. Lediglich von der CNB wird erwartet, dass sie den Leitzins vor Ende 2022 um 25 Basispunkte senkt. <\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die realen Leitzinsen werden voraussichtlich aufgrund der f\u00fcr 2022 erwarteten Straffung der Finanzpolitik und des Kaufkraftverlusts der privaten Haushalte infolge von Angebotsschocks niedrig gehalten werden. Weitere Vorsichtsma\u00dfnahmen d\u00fcrften die Finanzierungsbedingun-gen versch\u00e4rfen, wobei die Kreditvergabe an die privaten Haushalte weiter rasch ansteigt.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die CBRT und die CBR werden die Zinss\u00e4tze 2022 wahrscheinlich senken, aber die Finanzierungsbedingungen in der T\u00fcrkei k\u00f6nnten sich dennoch versch\u00e4rfen, wenn der USD-TRY weiter ansteigt. Wir gehen davon aus, dass die CBR den Leitzins bis 2023 auf 5% anheben wird, w\u00e4hrend wir in der T\u00fcrkei eine deutliche Umkehr der Zinssenkungen erwarten. <\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die wichtigsten (geo-)politischen Risiken im Jahr 2022 ergeben sich unserer Ansicht nach aus dem Patt zwischen der EU und Ungarn sowie Polen, den knappen Parlamentswahlen in Ungarn, der Migrantenkrise an der Ostgrenze der EU, den ethnischen Spannungen in Bosnien-Herzegowina, den fragilen Regierungskoalitionen in Rum\u00e4nien, der Slowakei, Slowenien und der T\u00fcrkei, den m\u00f6glichen Sanktionen gegen Russland, den Gaslieferungen nach Europa und den sozialen Unruhen aufgrund der hohen Energie- und Lebensmittelpreise.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisIt":""},{"layout":"detailed","uid":26246,"publicationDate":"28 Sep 21","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_181231.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJONVgIeo7x-ZU6taDmKjrKk=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Economics Chartbook - Central banks head for exit (4Q21)","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"The Unicredit Economics Chartbook","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Global: <\/strong> Growth has peaked, and we are fine-tuning our global GDP growth forecast for this year, to 5.8% from 6%, and for next year, to 4.6% from 4.7%. The spread of the Delta variant has weighed on demand over the summer, while shortages of materials and labor continue to constrain supply and will probably last into 2022. Growth is likely to remain robust next year, thanks to accumulated household savings, inventory restocking, and the declining economic effects of each new wave of COVID-19. However, growth rates will naturally ease as pent-up demand, fiscal support and spare capacity fade. Inflation will likely remain high through year-end before moderating as base effects turn negative and supply starts to adjust. Central banks will continue to chart a gradual exit from emergency measures.<\/li><li><strong> US: <\/strong> We now expect GDP growth of 5.8% this year (from 6.1%) while our forecast for next year is 3.9% (from 3.8%). This is the result of a downward revision to growth in 3Q21 and slightly stronger growth early next year. GDP is likely to reach its pre-pandemic trend line in 1Q22, a quarter later than previously expected. Inflation is close to peaking but will likely remain elevated well into next year as supply disruption looks set to last longer than anticipated. We continue to see inflation falling back towards 2% by end-2022. The Fed will likely start tapering its QE in November and cease net purchases around mid-2022. We expect the first rate hike in early 2023, followed by a second hike in 2H23.<\/li><li><strong> Eurozone: <\/strong> GDP is likely to expand by 5% this year and by 4.3% in 2022. Activity is set to increase strongly again in 3Q21, followed by slower growth at the turn of the year as the reopening boost fades and manufacturing output slows. GDP will probably recover to its pre-pandemic level by year-end. Prospects for 2022 remain positive, supported by deployment of NGEU funds, but activity is unlikely to return to its pre-crisis trend before 2023. Inflation will probably peak in November at close to 4%, before falling sharply over the course of next year. The ECB seems keen to close the PEPP in March. If so, maintaining easy financing conditions and a smooth transmission of monetary policy would require stepping up the pace of the APP and increasing its flexibility.<\/li><li><strong> CEE: <\/strong> We expect economies in EU-CEE and in the Western Balkans to grow by around 6% in 2021 and 4.6% in 2022. Turkey\u00b4s economy could expand by 9.7% in 2021 and 5.5% in 2022. In Russia, GDP growth could slow from 4% in 2021 to 2.4% in 2022. In 2021, the recovery has been driven by pent-up consumer demand\u00a0and exports. In 2022, investment could contribute more to growth, helped in EU-CEE by NGEU disbursements, in Russia by spending from the National Wealth Fund and in Turkey by easier financial conditions. Supply-chain bottlenecks, rising energy prices and buoyant consumer demand could keep inflation outside target ranges for longer than central banks currently expect. Further monetary tightening is needed to ensure price stability.<\/li><li><strong> UK: <\/strong> We are lowering our GDP growth forecasts to 6.4% for this year (from 6.7%) and 5.9% next year (from 6.1%), delaying the time when we expect GDP to surpass its pre-pandemic level by one quarter to 2Q22. Inflation is set to rise to almost 4% in 4Q21 and remain there through 2Q22, before falling back to close to 2% by end-2022. The MPC seems prepared to raise rates as soon as February, but we expect lower growth and higher unemployment to delay a hike until late 2022\/early 2023.<\/li><li><strong> China: <\/strong> We are reducing our GDP growth forecast for 2021 to 8.2% from 8.5%, and for 2022 to 5.0% from 5.7%. The summer turned out to be challenging due to a mix of natural disasters and the spread of the Delta variant. Looking beyond 3Q21, there are several headwinds that might dent the economic outlook, from abrupt state interventionism to rising vulnerabilities in the real estate sector and an economically-damaging 'zero tolerance' approach to COVID-19. Fiscal and monetary policy are likely to remain accommodative. <\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":""},{"layout":"detailed","uid":25701,"publicationDate":"30 Jun 21","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2021_180566.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRoSIN084bMP6FuoAhlg8moqA==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2021_180834.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRowVR_C5Bsx474E54GL3660g==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - The reopening (3Q21)","titleDe":"Die Wiederer\u00f6ffnung (3Q21)","titleIt":"","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect economies in EU-CEE and in the Western Balkans, to grow by around 5% in 2021 and 4.5% in 2022 after slumping by close to 4% in 2020. We see Hungary, Poland, Romania and Serbia returning to pre-pandemic levels of activity already in 2021, with the other countries following in 2022.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Pent-up demand could drive the recovery, as consumers and companies increased their savings in 2020. Government transfers will further support household finances. Pre-funding from the EU\u00b4s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) might start arriving in 3Q21, further boosting investment.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Turkey\u00b4s economy could grow by 7.5% in 2021, the fastest in CEE, after avoiding a recession in 2020. In 2022, growth might slow to 3.5% if financial conditions remain tight.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The Russian economy is expected to grow by around 3.4% this year and 2.6% next year, recouping all pandemic losses. Domestic demand could increase as households reduce their savings and companies start investing again.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In 2021, the summer rebound will be driven by services, which suffered the most during lockdowns. The subsequent recovery could be bumpy, as all sectors face labor shortages. Manufacturing, which led the economic rebound since last summer, and construction also face supply-chain bottlenecks that will slow their growth.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Throughout CEE, the main risk to growth is another spike in COVID-19 cases and deaths later in 2021 as the speed of vaccination has slowed since May. Bulgaria, Russia and Romania face bigger threats in this respect than Czechia, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Supply shocks and stronger demand are expected to push inflation higher. The momentum in cyclical inflation continues to rise, while commodity prices may contribute less to inflation from here on. Czechia and Serbia are the only countries likely to hit inflation targets this year. Next year, stronger domestic demand will keep inflation outside or close to the top of target ranges.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect additional rate hikes this year, to 1.35% in Hungary, 1.00% in Czechia and 6.5% in Russia. The NBP could start raising rates in 4Q21 or 1Q22, taking the policy rate to 1.5%. The NBR could take the key rate to 1.75-2% in 2022. The CBRT could cut the policy rate by 2.5pp this year and 3pp next year, to 13.5%, with the CBR cutting as well, to 5.5%.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The main risks are domestic and mostly related to politics. Elections in Bulgaria and Czechia could result in fragile majorities. Infighting among Slovakia\u00b4s governing parties could delay reforms. A leadership contest in the Liberal party could reshape the Romanian government. Political interference remains the biggest risk for monetary policy in Turkey. In 3Q21, the geopolitical risk premium on Russian financial assets could diminish.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wir erwarten, dass die Volkswirtschaften in der EU-CEE -Region und auf dem Westbalkan nach einem Einbruch von knapp 4% im Jahr 2020 im Jahr 2021 um rund 5% und im Jahr 2022 um 4,5% wachsen werden. Wir sehen Ungarn, Polen, Rum\u00e4nien und Serbien bereits 2021 auf das Niveau vor der Pandemie zur\u00fcckkehren, die anderen L\u00e4nder folgen 2022.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die aufgestaute Nachfrage k\u00f6nnte die Erholung vorantreiben, nachdem die Verbraucher und Unternehmen ihre Ersparnisse im Jahr 2020 erh\u00f6ht hatten. Staatliche Transfers werden die Haushaltsfinanzen weiter unterst\u00fctzen. Vorfinanzierungen aus dem EU-Programm f\u00fcr Wiederaufbau und Stabilit\u00e4t (RRF = Recovery and Resilience Fund) k\u00f6nnten ab 3Q21 eintreffen und die Investitionen weiter ankurbeln.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die t\u00fcrkische Wirtschaft d\u00fcrfte 2021 um 7,5% wachsen, das schnellste Wachstum in der CEE-Region, nachdem 2020 eine Rezession vermieden werden konnte. Im Jahr 2022 k\u00f6nnte sich das Wachstum auf 3,5% verlangsamen, wenn die Finanzierungsbedingungen angespannt bleiben.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Es wird erwartet, dass die russische Wirtschaft in diesem Jahr um etwa 3,4% und im n\u00e4chsten Jahr um 2,6% wachsen wird und damit alle Pandemieverluste wieder wettmachen kann. Die Inlandsnachfrage d\u00fcrfte steigen, da die Haushalte ihre Ersparnisse reduzieren und die Unternehmen wieder investieren.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Im Jahr 2021 wird die Erholung im Sommer vermutlich vom Dienstleistungssektor getragen, der w\u00e4hrend der Schlie\u00dfungen am meisten gelitten hatte. Die anschlie\u00dfende Erholung k\u00f6nnte holprig verlaufen, da alle Sektoren mit einem Arbeitskr\u00e4ftemangel zu k\u00e4mpfen haben. Das verarbeitende Gewerbe, das die wirtschaftliche Erholung seit dem letzten Sommer angef\u00fchrt hatte und das Baugewerbe sehen sich zus\u00e4tzlich mit Engp\u00e4ssen in der Lieferkette konfrontiert, die ihr Wachstum verlangsamen werden.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In der ganzen CEE-Region besteht das Hauptrisiko f\u00fcr das Wachstum in einem weiteren Anstieg der COVID-19-Infektionen und Todesf\u00e4lle sp\u00e4ter im Jahr 2021, da die Geschwindigkeit der Impfungen seit Mai nachgelassen hat. Bulgarien, Russland und Rum\u00e4nien sind in dieser Hinsicht st\u00e4rker bedroht als Tschechien, die T\u00fcrkei, Polen, Ungarn, Slowenien und die Slowakei.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Angebotsschocks und eine st\u00e4rkere Nachfrage werden die Inflation voraussichtlich nach oben treiben. Die Dynamik der zyklischen Inflation nimmt weiter zu, w\u00e4hrend die Rohstoffpreise ab jetzt weniger zur Inflation beitragen d\u00fcrften. Tschechien und Serbien sind die einzigen L\u00e4nder, die in diesem Jahr die Inflationsziele erreichen d\u00fcrften. Im n\u00e4chsten Jahr wird die st\u00e4rkere Inlandsnachfrage die Inflation au\u00dferhalb oder nahe am oberen Rand der Zielbereiche halten.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wir erwarten weitere Zinserh\u00f6hungen in diesem Jahr, auf 1,35% in Ungarn, 1,00% in Tschechien und 6,5% in Russland. Die NBP k\u00f6nnte in 4Q21 oder 1Q22 mit Zinserh\u00f6hungen beginnen und den Leitzins auf 1,5% anheben. Die NBR wird den Leitzins im Jahr 2022 voraussichtlich auf 1,75-2% anheben. Die CBRT d\u00fcrfte den Leitzins in diesem Jahr um 2,5 Pp. und im n\u00e4chsten Jahr um 3 Pp. auf 13,5% senken, w\u00e4hrend die CBR ebenfalls eine Senkung auf 5,5% vornehmen k\u00f6nnte.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die Hauptrisiken sind inl\u00e4ndischer Natur und beziehen sich haupts\u00e4chlich auf die Politik. Die Wahlen in Bulgarien und Tschechien k\u00f6nnten zu fragilen Mehrheiten f\u00fchren. Unstimmigkeiten zwischen den slowakischen Regierungsparteien werden vermutlich Reformen verz\u00f6gern. Ein F\u00fchrungsstreit in der Partei der Liberalen k\u00f6nnte zu einer Umgestaltung der rum\u00e4nischen Regierung f\u00fchren. Politische Einmischung bleibt das gr\u00f6\u00dfte Risiko f\u00fcr die Geldpolitik in der T\u00fcrkei. In 3Q21 k\u00f6nnte die geopolitische Risikopr\u00e4mie auf russische Finanzanlagen abnehmen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisIt":""}]

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Artem Arkhipov
Head of Macroeconomic Analysis and Research, Russia
UniCredit Russia
Prechistenskaya nab. 9 -
RU-119034 Moscow
+7 495 258-7258

Artem Arkhipov joined the UniCredit Research team in 2011 and is Head of Macroeconomic Analysis and Research Russia. Before joining UniCredit, Artem worked for a large emerging...

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