d60f69f8f9239602114dc51c5a65199ea51b2fc6e6b15abe1e29b1549dd25a9c;;[{"layout":"detailed","uid":28820,"publicationDate":"09 Jan 23","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2023_184441.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRo7oSiWTU9yyA8K_ZQ8Wb5BQ==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2023_184511.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRo1VsaZ7M0QsRKPBOMsgOvsg==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - Weathering geopolitical and economic shocks (1Q23)","titleDe":"CEE Quarterly - Im Spannungsfeld geopolitischer und wirtschaftlicher Schocks","titleIt":"","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>We forecast a technical recession throughout CEE over the winter due to falling purchasing power and foreign demand, tighter financial conditions and lower fiscal spending. A rebound is likely from 2H23 onwards if the eurozone economy recovers as well.<\/li><li>We expect the economies in EU-CEE to grow by around 0.5% in 2023 and 3.3% in 2024, slowing from 4.4% in 2022. The Western Balkans might trail the EU-CEE recovery.<\/li><li>In Turkey, we expect economic growth of 2.9% in 2023 and 3.6% in 2024, with growth improving in 2024 only if financial risks are addressed after the 2023 elections. In Russia, the recession could accelerate to -5% in 2023, followed by a small rebound to around 2.5% in 2024 if import substitution improves, underpinning a gradual recovery in aggregate supply. <\/li><li>We forecast inflation to peak in 1Q23 in both EU-CEE and the Western Balkans. Thereafter, fiscal transfers, tight labor-market conditions and higher energy and food prices could keep inflation outside target ranges in 2023-24.<\/li><li>As a result, we see the scope for rate cuts in EU-CEE as being limited to 4.5-7% by 2024, while in Turkey we expect rates to be hiked to 45% this year if the opposition wins the elections. In Russia, cuts to 6.5% are possible if inflation returns to target in 2024.<\/li><li>All CEE central banks will continue to intervene in FX markets, with those in Romania and Serbia being more successful. The CBR could allow the RUB to depreciate gradually.<\/li><li>We assume that the Russia-Ukraine war will continue into 2024, without escalating to the use of non-conventional weapons and\/or spilling over to the rest of Europe.<\/li><li>Besides a more damaging conflict, the main risks for CEE in 2023 are the lack of a common European energy policy, a standoff between the European Commission and Hungary and Poland due to weak adherence to the rule of law, low reform appetite ahead of elections in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia and Turkey, a financial crisis in Turkey if monetary and fiscal policies are not tightened after the elections, nationalist tensions in the Western Balkans, and Russia\u00b4s deepening economic isolation.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"<p>\u00dcbersetzung der englischen Originalversion vom 9. Januar 2023<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Wir prognostizieren eine technische Rezession in der ganzen CEE-Region \u00fcber den Winter aufgrund der sinkenden Kaufkraft und Auslandsnachfrage, strengerer Finanzierungsbedingungen und geringerer Haushaltsausgaben. Ein Aufschwung ist ab 2H23 wahrscheinlich, wenn sich auch die Wirtschaft der Eurozone erholt.<\/li><li>Wir gehen davon aus, dass die Volkswirtschaften in der EU-CEE-Region im Jahr 2023 um rund 0,5% und im Jahr 2024 um 3,3% wachsen werden, was eine Verlangsamung gegen\u00fcber den 4,4% im Jahr 2022 bedeutet. Der Westbalkan k\u00f6nnte hinter der EU-CEE-Erholung zur\u00fcckbleiben.<\/li><li>In der T\u00fcrkei erwarten wir ein Wirtschaftswachstum von 2,9% im Jahr 2023 und 3,6% im Jahr 2024, wobei sich das Wachstum im Jahr 2024 nur verbessern wird, wenn die finanziellen Risiken nach den Wahlen im Jahr 2023 angegangen werden. In Russland k\u00f6nnte sich die Rezession im Jahr 2023 auf -5% beschleunigen, gefolgt von einer leichten Erholung auf etwa 2,5% im Jahr 2024, wenn sich die Importsubstitution verbessert und eine allm\u00e4hliche Erholung des Gesamtangebots unterst\u00fctzt.<\/li><li>Wir prognostizieren, dass die Inflation in 1Q23 sowohl in der EU-CEE-Region als auch in den westlichen Balkanl\u00e4ndern ihren H\u00f6hepunkt erreichen wird. Danach k\u00f6nnten fiskalische Transfers, angespannte Arbeitsmarktbedingungen und h\u00f6here Energie- und Lebensmittel-preise die Inflation in den Jahren 2023-24 au\u00dferhalb der Zielbereiche halten.<\/li><li>Daher sehen wir den Spielraum f\u00fcr Zinssenkungen in der EU-CEE-Region bis 2024 auf 4,5-7% begrenzt, w\u00e4hrend wir in der T\u00fcrkei eine Anhebung der Zinss\u00e4tze auf 45% in diesem Jahr erwarten, falls die Opposition die Wahlen gewinnt. In Russland sind Zinssenkungen auf 6,5% m\u00f6glich, wenn die Inflation bis 2024 wieder das Ziel erreicht.<\/li><li>Alle Zentralbanken in Mittel- und Osteuropa werden weiterhin an den Devisenm\u00e4rkten intervenieren, wobei die Zentralbanken in Rum\u00e4nien und Serbien erfolgreicher seien d\u00fcrften. Die CBR k\u00f6nnte eine allm\u00e4hliche Abwertung des RUB zulassen.<\/li><li>Wir gehen davon aus, dass der Krieg zwischen Russland und der Ukraine bis ins Jahr 2024 andauern wird, ohne dass es zu einer Eskalation mit dem Einsatz nicht-konventioneller Waffen und\/oder einem \u00dcbergreifen auf das \u00fcbrige Europa kommt.<\/li><li>Neben einem sch\u00e4dlicheren Konflikt sind die Hauptrisiken f\u00fcr die CEE-Region im Jahr 2023 das Fehlen einer gemeinsamen europ\u00e4ischen Energiepolitik, eine Pattsituation zwischen der Europ\u00e4ischen Kommission und Ungarn sowie Polen aufgrund der schwachen Einhaltung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, eine geringe Reformbereitschaft vor den Wahlen in Bulgarien, Polen, der Slowakei und der T\u00fcrkei, eine Finanzkrise in der T\u00fcrkei, wenn die Geld- und Fiskalpolitik nach den Wahlen nicht gestrafft wird, nationalistische Spannungen auf dem westlichen Balkan und die zunehmende wirtschaftliche Isolation Russlands.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisIt":"","hash":"d60f69f8f9239602114dc51c5a65199ea51b2fc6e6b15abe1e29b1549dd25a9c","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"detailed","size":"default","showanalysts":"2","showcompanies":"2","showcountries":"2","showcurrencies":"2","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M y","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"300","synopsisexpand":"1","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"5"}},{"layout":"detailed","uid":28500,"publicationDate":"28 Sep 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_184012.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJKZXH2GAVJvL78LWAPe4_o0=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Economics Chartbook - Central banks\u00b4 inflation fight raises recession odds (4Q22)","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"The Unicredit Economics Chartbook","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong>Global: <\/strong> The growth outlook is deteriorating. After likely subdued growth of 2.7% this year, we forecast global GDP rising by only 1.9% next year. The weakening reflects tighter financial conditions, surging energy bills in Europe and reduced economic momentum across the US, Europe, and China. The manufacturing sector is under pressure, the boost to services from the reopening of the economy is fading, and consumer confidence is low. Supply constraints have eased but remain elevated compared to before the pandemic. High excess savings and the tight labor market should mean any recession is mild. We expect global inflation to ease next year amid negative base effects, lower demand, a further easing of supply constraints and lower commodities prices. The risks to growth are to the downside as central banks prioritize fighting inflation.<\/li><li><strong>US: <\/strong> We forecast GDP growth of 1.5% this year and -0.1% next year (previously +0.1%), with the economy teetering on the edge of recession. The weakness is concentrated in interest-rate-sensitive sectors, notably housing and durable goods. Monthly headline inflation will likely ease sustainably to levels consistent with the 2% target from the spring, while core inflation is likely to take longer to do so. The midterm elections seem likely to result in political gridlock. We now see the Fed raising interest rates to a peak of 4.50-4.75% (previously 3.75-4.00%) by early next year, followed by a first rate cut in late 2023.<\/li><li><strong>Eurozone: <\/strong> GDP growth is likely to average 3.1% this year and come to a standstill in 2023 (0.2%). The latest survey indicators point to a recession at the turn of the year, in line with our baseline scenario. Inflation is likely to hover at around 10% for the remainder of the year, before entering a downward trajectory that would take it towards 2.5% by the end of 2023. We are raising our forecast for the peak level of the deposit rate by 25bp to 2.25%, to be reached in 1Q23. As policy rates rise towards, or above, the upper end of the neutrality range, the ECB is likely to start looking at quantitative tightening (QT) as its next policy step.<\/li><li><strong>CEE: <\/strong> We forecast GDP growth to slow from 4.3% in 2022 to 0.8% in 2023 in EU-CEE and from 5.5% in 2022 to 3.2% in 2023 in Turkey. In Russia, we expect the economy to shrink by around 5% this year and 4% in 2023. We believe that CEE can avoid an energy crisis, but not a technical recession in 4Q22-1Q23 due to high energy prices, circumspect consumers, negative credit and fiscal impulses, destocking, imports outpacing exports, low EU fund inflows and falling public investment. A gradual recovery is possible in 2H23. Inflation is likely to peak this winter in all CEE countries and to remain well above target in 2023. We expect tightening cycles to end at 13% in Hungary, 7% in Czechia and Poland, 6% in Romania and 5% in Serbia. The CBRT is likely to cut its policy rate to single digits and the CBR to 7%. FX interventions will likely continue in Czechia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Turkey.<\/li><li><strong>UK: <\/strong> We are revising our GDP growth forecasts down slightly to 3.3% for this year (previously 3.5%), and to -0.3% for next year (previously -0.1%). The economy is likely already in recession. The energy price cap means inflation will probably peak at just under 11% in October. Large and poorly targeted fiscal easing at a time of constrained supply will likely force the BoE to hike the bank rate sharply to 4.50% (previously 2.50%).<\/li><li><strong>China: <\/strong> We are reducing our GDP growth forecast for 2022 to 2.0% from 2.4%, and for 2023 to 3.4% from 4.0%. The combination of power shortages, sporadic lockdowns and a real estate sector in disarray is weighing on economic activity. However, contained inflationary pressure, both on the producer and consumer front, is allowing the government to use its monetary and fiscal policy levers to support the economy ahead of the party congress that will likely elevate Xi Jinping to a third term as president of the country. After hitting new lows since 2008, the CNY is set to remain weak against the USD, beyond 7.20.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":""},{"layout":"detailed","uid":28499,"publicationDate":"28 Sep 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2022_184011.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRoYLcQZAba8MpzoBozIhtkyg==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2022_184113.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRoF1klgfaq4sGR5On3ncns1Q==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - Testing resilience ahead of the winter (4Q22)","titleDe":"CEE Quarterly - Test der Widerstandsf\u00e4higkeit vor dem Winter","titleIt":"","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Europe is heading into a difficult winter, but we believe that CEE can avoid an energy crisis, even if Russia halts all exports of natural gas to Europe. <\/li><li>We expect a technical recession in 4Q21-1Q23 caused by high energy prices, circumspect consumers, negative credit and fiscal impulses, destocking, imports outpacing exports, low EU fund inflows and falling public investment. A gradual recovery is possible in 2H23. <\/li><li>We forecast economic growth to slow from 4.3% in 2022 to 0.8% in 2023 in EU-CEE, with the Western Balkans lagging this year and outperforming in 2023. We see Turkey\u00b4s economy growing by 5.5% in 2022 and 3.2% in 2023. In Russia, we expect the economy to shrink by around 5% this year and 4% in 2023, with the overall contraction similar to our previous forecast.<\/li><li>Inflation is likely to peak this winter in all CEE countries, as inflation momentum is strengthening only in Hungary. We expect inflation to remain well above target in 2023 due to higher retail energy prices, resilient domestic demand and tight labor markets. <\/li><li>We believe that the CNB has ended its tightening cycle at 7% and the NBH at 13%. We expect the NBP to stop hiking at 7%, the NBR at 6% and the NBS at 5%. The CBRT is likely to cut its policy rate to single digits, hiking sharply in 2023 if the opposition wins the parliamentary election. We expect the CBR to end cuts at 7%. <\/li><li>We expect FX interventions to continue in Czechia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. Only the CNB is considering phasing out its FX sales. <\/li><li>Besides a protracted conflict between Russia and Ukraine and its potential spillover to Europe, we highlight the following risks: 1. Russia\u00b4s inability to substitute imports from the West, 2. potential economic sanctions if Turkey continues to cooperate with Russia, 3. low EU transfers as the European Commission focuses on the rule of law, 4. pre-election populism affecting economic policies and ratings, 5. Hungary\u00b4s geopolitical isolation with possible repercussions on FDI, 6. Bulgaria\u00b4s protracted election cycle and the potential postponement of euro adoption and 7. Serbia\u00b4s political reshuffling to avoid choosing between Europe and Russia.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>In Europa steht ein schwieriger Winter bevor, aber wir glauben, dass die CEE-Region eine Energiekrise vermeiden kann, selbst wenn Russland alle Erdgasexporte nach Europa stoppt. <\/li><li>Wir erwarten eine technische Rezession im Zeitraum 4Q21-1Q23, verursacht durch hohe Energiepreise, vorsich-tige Verbraucher, negative Kredit- und Steuerimpulse, Lagerabbau, Importe, die die Exporte \u00fcbersteigen, geringe Zufl\u00fcsse von EU-Fonds und sinkende \u00f6ffentliche Investitionen. Eine allm\u00e4hliche Erholung ist in 2H23 m\u00f6glich. <\/li><li>Wir prognostizieren eine Verlangsamung des Wirtschaftswachstums in der EU-CEE-Region von 4,3% im Jahr 2022 auf 0,8% im Jahr 2023, wobei die westlichen Balkanl\u00e4nder in diesem Jahr zur\u00fcckbleiben und 2023 \u00fcber-durchschnittlich wachsen d\u00fcrften. F\u00fcr die T\u00fcrkei erwarten wir ein Wirtschaftswachstum von 5,5% im Jahr 2022 und 3,2% im Jahr 2023. In Russland rechnen wir mit einem R\u00fcckgang der Wirtschaft um rund 5% in diesem Jahr und 4% im Jahr 2023, wobei der Gesamtr\u00fcckgang unserer vorherigen Prognose entspricht.<\/li><li>Die Inflation d\u00fcrfte in diesem Winter in allen CEE-L\u00e4ndern ihren H\u00f6hepunkt erreichen, wobei die Inflationsdynamik nur noch in Ungarn zunimmt. Wir erwarten, dass die Inflation im Jahr 2023 aufgrund h\u00f6herer Energiepreise f\u00fcr die Endkunden, einer robusten Inlandsnachfrage und der angespannten Arbeitsm\u00e4rkte deutlich \u00fcber dem Zielwert bleiben wird. <\/li><li>Wir glauben, dass die CNB ihren Straffungszyklus bei 7% und die NBH bei 13% beendet haben. Wir gehen davon aus, dass die NBP ihre Zinserh\u00f6hungen bei 7%, die NBR bei 6% und die NBS bei 5% beenden werden. Die CBRT wird ihren Leitzins wahrscheinlich auf einen einstelligen Wert senken und 2023 stark anheben, falls die Opposition die Parlamentswahlen gewinnen sollte. Wir erwarten, dass die CBR ihre Zinssenkungen bei 7% beenden wird.<\/li><li>Wir erwarten, dass die Devisenmarktinterventionen in der Tschechischen Republik, Polen, Rum\u00e4nien, Serbien und der T\u00fcrkei fortgesetzt werden. Nur die CNB erw\u00e4gt, ihre Devisenverk\u00e4ufe auslaufen zu lassen.<\/li><li>Neben einem langwierigen Konflikt zwischen Russland und der Ukraine und seinen m\u00f6glichen Auswirkungen auf Europa sehen wir folgende Risiken: 1. Russlands Unf\u00e4higkeit, Importe aus dem Westen zu ersetzen, 2. potenzielle Wirtschaftssanktionen, wenn die T\u00fcrkei weiterhin mit Russland zusammenarbeitet, 3. geringe EU-Transfers, da sich die Europ\u00e4ische Kommission auf die Rechtsstaatlichkeit konzentriert, 4. Populismus vor den Wahlen, der sich auf die Wirtschaftspolitik und die Ratings auswirkt, 5. die geopolitische Isolation Ungarns mit m\u00f6gli-chen Auswirkungen auf ausl\u00e4ndische Direktinvestitionen, 6. der langwierige Wahlzyklus Bulgariens und die m\u00f6gliche Verschiebung der Euro-Einf\u00fchrung und 7. Serbiens politische Umstrukturierung, um eine Entscheidung zwischen Europa und Russland zu vermeiden.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisIt":""},{"layout":"detailed","uid":28210,"publicationDate":"29 Jun 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2022_183650.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPRjevfYGAe4I4tua3mCuHw=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Economics Chartbook - Downside risks to growth building (3Q22)","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"The Unicredit Economics Chartbook","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong>Global: <\/strong> GDP growth will probably slow to 3.0% this year (previously 3.3%) and 2.8% next year (from 3.4%). Headwinds from the Russia-Ukraine conflict have combined with COVID-19 lockdowns in China to push inflation up further and slow the pace of economic activity. Central banks have become even more hawkish. Tighter financial conditions, a squeeze in real incomes and a sharp downturn in consumer confidence will increasingly weigh on activity. Trade is weakening, also reflecting a switching of expenditure away from goods. Global inflation will probably peak soon, but the speed and extent of the subsequent decline remains highly uncertain. We think that central banks and markets are underestimating the downside risks to growth. If Russian energy imports suddenly stop, much of Europe will likely see negative GDP growth for 2023.<\/li><li><strong>US: <\/strong> We forecast GDP growth of 2.4% this year and below-potential growth of 1.3% next year. Economic momentum is slowing, particularly for interest-rate-sensitive sectors such as housing and durable goods. CPI inflation will likely peak at about 9% yoy in 3Q22, with monthly inflation prints likely easing to levels consistent with target by around the turn of the year. Longer-run measures of inflation expectations are still well anchored and average hourly earnings growth is moderating. We expect the Fed to raise the target range for the federal funds rate into restrictive territory by the end of the year, to 3.25-3.50%, which we see as the peak. Rate cuts could start in late 2023.<\/li><li><strong>Eurozone: <\/strong> GDP is likely to expand by 2.8% this year and by 1.3% in 2023. Survey indicators signal a weakening of growth momentum in the spring and downside risks for economic activity in 2H22. Headline and core inflation have further to rise, although we see initial signs that pipeline price pressure might start easing soon from extremely high levels. Weak growth and slowing inflation will probably force the ECB to stop hiking in 1Q23 once the depo rate reaches 1.25%, i.e. the lower end of the 1-2% range the central bank regards as 'neutral'. We expect the announcement of a credible anti-fragmentation facility featuring potentially unlimited purchases and light conditionality.<\/li><li><strong>CEE: <\/strong> The EU-CEE economies will likely grow on average by 3.6% in 2022 and 2.6% in 2023, with the Western Balkans lagging. Turkey could grow by 4.4% in 2022 and 3.3% in 2023. In Russia, the economy could shrink by around 10% this year and stall next year. Hungary and Slovakia would experience the biggest direct impact from a lack of Russian energy imports, followed by Bulgaria, Czechia and Serbia. Inflation is likely to peak this year in most CEE countries, except for Hungary and Poland, where the peak could be postponed to 2023. Inflation is expected to remain well above targets in 2023. We think that central banks will end rate hikes in the autumn, but the scope for rate cuts in 2023 is very limited. The CBR could cut the policy rate to 8% in 2022 and to 7% in 2023. The CBRT might hike in 2023 if there is a change in government.<\/li><li><strong>UK: <\/strong> We forecast GDP growth of 3.4% this year and 0.6% next year. The economy will be skating on the edge of recession for the next few quarters amid a big squeeze in real disposable income. Inflation is set to stay higher for longer in the UK compared to peers, peaking at above 9% yoy in 4Q22, but should fall quickly to below 2% by end-2023. The BoE will probably stop raising the bank rate after a final 25bp hike to 1.50% in August.<\/li><li><strong>China: <\/strong> GDP will likely grow by 4.0% in 2022 and by 4.2% in 2023. While most COVID-19-related restrictions were lifted at the beginning of June, the supply side of the economy is recovering faster than the demand side as Chinese consumers continue their cautious behavior to avoid quarantines. The central government is stepping up efforts to support the economy and reduce the negative impact of future waves of contagion on the domestic economy through a combination of monetary and fiscal policy measures. The PBoC might tolerate further weakening of the CNY towards 7.00 against the USD to support exports.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":""},{"layout":"detailed","uid":27589,"publicationDate":"30 Mar 22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2022_182907.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRooLgAZTPWCLUSnFz7GhBRew==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2022_183204.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRowzPsxhSxJZfjfaWjJHQarQ==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - Turmoil in Europe: The impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on CEE (2Q22)","titleDe":"CEE Quarterly - Unruhen in Europa: Die Auswirkungen des Russland-Ukraine-Konflikts auf die CEE-Region","titleIt":"","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Russia\u00b4s invasion of Ukraine could be a watershed moment for Europe\u00b4s political and economic landscape.<\/li><li> Comprehensive sanctions could affect CEE\u00b4s trade with Russia and also domestic sectors in which Russian investment is important, such as energy and metals. Sanctions are already leading to higher commodity prices and lower commodity imports from Russia<\/li><li> Russian countersanctions and other measures are likely to impact CEE through the ban on food exports (with Turkey hardest hit), RUB payments for Russian gas (with the Balkans the most at risk), potential spillovers on risk appetite from Russia\u00b4s capital controls.<\/li><li> If Russia continues to export oil and gas to Europe, we expect its economy to shrink by around 12% this year (peak-to-trough of around 20%), with a muted rebound in 2023 akin to stagnation. In EU-CEE1) and in the Western Balkans, GDP is expected to grow by around 2.3% in 2022 and by 3.6% in 2023. The direct impact of the conflict on GDP growth is estimated at 1.5-3pp in 2022 and up to 1.5pp in 2023. Turkey could grow by around 4% this year and 3.8% in 2023.<\/li><li>We expect CEE to gradually reduce its dependency on Russian hydrocarbons with help from NextGenerationEU (NGEU). CEE governments might help households and companies weather higher commodity prices by incurring larger budget deficits. However, a new common EU fund might be needed to fight rapid price increases.<\/li><li>If the EU stops importing oil and gas from Russia, the Russian economy could shrink by around 20% this year and fail to rebound in 2023. In such a scenario, EU-CEE and the Western Balkans would probably fall into recession.<\/li><li>Inflation could reach 30-year highs due to rapidly rising commodity and food prices, and supply-chain bottlenecks. We expect inflation to end this year at or above 10% in Central Europe, at around 35% in Russia and at close to 60% in Turkey. Inflation targets could be missed again in 2023 amid persistent supply shocks.<\/li><li>We expect rates to be hiked to 6% in Hungary and Poland, 4.75% in Czechia, 4% in Romania and 2% in Serbia. Central banks are likely to intervene in FX markets to avoid depreciation above EUR-HUF 380, EUR-PLN 4.80 and EUR-RON 5.00 (with the NBR probably relaxing this stance if the conflict in Ukraine ends). <\/li><li>Liquidity management and FX interventions could keep interbank interest rates above 5% and push forward implied interest rates into double digits in times of stress. Thus, we see little scope for positioning against CEE currencies, especially in Romania and Serbia. <\/li><li>In our view, the main political consequences of the conflict in Ukraine are the following: 1. Russia is likely to drift further away from the West, both economically and politically; 2. Relations between Turkey and NATO are likely to improve; 3. Poland could become more engaged in European affairs and regional politics, moving closer to the EU. NGEU money could be unblocked for both Poland and Hungary; 4. Hungary could become more isolated in the EU and in the Visegrad group; 5. Serbia might be forced to choose between the EU and Russia; 6. The EU could increase its involvement in the political crisis affecting Bosnia-Herzegovina; 7. Economic shocks might fuel political instability in Slovenia and Romania; 8. Despite support from EU-CEE, Ukraine is unlikely to become an EU member any time soon.1) EU-CEE refers to CEE countries that are members of the EU: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>\u00dcbersetzung der englischen Originalversion vom 30. M\u00e4rz 2022<\/p><\/p><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Der Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine k\u00f6nnte einen Wendepunkt in der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Landschaft Europas darstellen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Umfassende Sanktionen d\u00fcrften sich auf den Handel der CEE-L\u00e4nder mit Russland und auch auf inl\u00e4ndische Sektoren auswirken, in denen russische Investitionen wichtig sind, wie etwa Energie und Metalle. Die Sanktionen f\u00fchren bereits zu h\u00f6heren Rohstoffpreisen und geringeren Rohstoffimporten aus Russland.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Russische Gegensanktionen und andere Ma\u00dfnahmen werden sich m\u00f6glicherweise auch auf die CEE-L\u00e4nder auswirken, und zwar durch das Verbot von Lebensmittelexporten (wobei die T\u00fcrkei am st\u00e4rksten betroffen ist), durch RUB-Zahlungen f\u00fcr russisches Gas (wobei die Balkanl\u00e4nder am st\u00e4rksten gef\u00e4hrdet sind) und durch potenzielle Auswirkungen auf die Risikobereitschaft aufgrund der russischen Kapitalverkehrskontrollen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wenn Russland weiterhin Erd\u00f6l und Gas nach Europa exportiert, erwarten wir, dass die russische Wirtschaft in diesem Jahr um etwa 12% zur\u00fcckgehen wird (vom H\u00f6chst- zum Tiefststand um etwa 20%), mit einem ged\u00e4mpften Aufschwung im Jahr 2023, der einer Stagnation gleichkommt. In der EU-CEE-Region1) und in den westlichen Balkanl\u00e4ndern d\u00fcrfte das BIP im Jahr 2022 um etwa 2,3% und im Jahr 2023 um 3,6% wachsen. Die direkten Auswirkungen des Konflikts auf das BIP-Wachstum werden auf 1,5 bis 3 Prozentpunkte im Jahr 2022 und bis zu 1,5 Prozentpunkte im Jahr 2023 gesch\u00e4tzt. Die T\u00fcrkei k\u00f6nnte in diesem Jahr um rund 4% und 2023 um 3,8% wachsen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wir erwarten, dass die CEE-L\u00e4nder ihre Abh\u00e4ngigkeit von russischen fossilen Energierohstoffen mit Hilfe des Next Generation EU-Programms (NGEU) schrittweise verringern werden. Die Regierungen der CEE-L\u00e4nder helfen m\u00f6glicherweise den Haushalten und Unternehmen, h\u00f6here Rohstoffpreise zu verkraften, indem sie gr\u00f6\u00dfere Haushaltsdefizite einfahren. Allerdings k\u00f6nnte ein neuer gemeinsamer EU-Fonds erforderlich sein, um den raschen Preisanstieg zu bek\u00e4mpfen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wenn die EU ihre Erd\u00f6l- und Gasimporte aus Russland einstellt, k\u00f6nnte die russische Wirtschaft in diesem Jahr um rund 20% zur\u00fcckgehen und sich bis 2023 nicht erholen. In einem solchen Szenario w\u00fcrden die EU, die CEE-Staaten und der westliche Balkan voraussichtlich in eine Rezession fallen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Die Inflation erreicht vermutlich aufgrund rasch steigender Rohstoff- und Lebensmittelpreise sowie Engp\u00e4ssen in der Versorgungskette den h\u00f6chsten Stand seit 30 Jahren. Wir erwarten, dass die Inflation in diesem Jahr in Mitteleuropa bei oder \u00fcber 10%, in Russland bei etwa 35% und in der T\u00fcrkei bei fast 60% liegen wird. Aufgrund anhaltender Angebotsschocks k\u00f6nnten die Inflationsziele im Jahr 2023 erneut verfehlt werden.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wir gehen davon aus, dass die Zinss\u00e4tze in Ungarn und Polen auf 6%, in der Tschechischen Republik auf 4,75%, in Rum\u00e4nien auf 4% und in Serbien auf 2% angehoben werden. Die Zentralbanken werden wahrscheinlich an den Devisenm\u00e4rkten intervenieren, um eine Abwertung \u00fcber EUR-HUF 380, EUR-PLN 4,80 und EUR-RON 5,00 zu vermeiden (wobei die NBR diese Haltung eventuell lockert, wenn der Konflikt in der Ukraine endet). <\/p><\/li><\/ul><p> <ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Ma\u00dfnahmen zum Liquidit\u00e4tsmanagement und Devisenmarktinterventionen k\u00f6nnten die Interbankenzinsen \u00fcber 5% halten und die impliziten Forward-Zinsen in Stresssituationen in den zweistelligen Bereich treiben. Daher sehen wir wenig Spielraum f\u00fcr eine Positionierung gegen\u00fcber den CEE-W\u00e4hrungen, insbesondere in Rum\u00e4nien und Serbien.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>1) EU-CEE bezieht sich auf die CEE-L\u00e4nder, die Mitglied der EU sind: Bulgarien, Kroatien, Polen, Rum\u00e4nien, die Slowakei, Slowenien, Tschechien und Ungarn.<\/p><\/p>","synopsisIt":""}]