UniCredit Research >  Research available without registration
Banner

Research available without registration

Economics Chartbook / Macro & Markets Outlook

06261aa6f7c2c702da46fc3167e51a8814508634daf9d94fabb8d1ef595da48e;;[{"layout":"detailed","uid":2683,"publicationDate":"26 Mar 24","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2024_186321.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJACkeUMzD3sVeHqwEVRGV0E=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Economics Chartbook - Global monetary policy approaches turning point","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"The Unicredit Economics Chartbook","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong>Global: <\/strong> Global GDP will likely grow by 2.9% this year and by 3.1% next year. This is subdued compared to historical averages, reflecting the lagged effects of tight monetary policy, reduced household savings buffers, softening labor markets, and less supportive fiscal policy. Disinflation remains on track, despite core inflation being stronger than generally expected at the start of the year. Services will likely contribute more to disinflation ahead as labor markets are softening, short-term inflation expectations of firms and households have eased meaningfully, and firms report finding it harder to pass on rising input costs to consumers. Most central banks are getting closer to cutting interest rates, while the BoJ bucked the global trend by exiting negative rates.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong>US: <\/strong> We continue to see GDP growth slowing to 1.8% this year and to 1.0% in 2025, down from 2.5% last year, as the strength of the consumer is likely to wane. We expect CPI inflation to fall to slightly above 2% by the end of this year, with core inflation following one quarter later. Further progress on disinflation is likely to come from housing and non-housing core services. The Fed will likely cut interest rates by 125bp this year, starting in June, and by 100bp next year. We expect an announcement on slowing the pace of Quantitative Tightening (QT) in May for a June start.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong>Eurozone: <\/strong> Our growth forecasts of 0.5% for this year and 1.2% for 2025 remain on track. We see a slow improvement in the quarterly GDP path as real-wage growth turning positive should support private consumption, while monetary policy will continue to restrain activity. The resilience of the labor market contains downside risks to activity and buys time for the ECB. Headline inflation will likely ease to 2% in 2H24 and fall below the ECB\u2019s goal in 2025. June remains the most likely timing for the first rate cut, but the path thereafter is highly uncertain. We still expect three 25bp rate cuts this year, one per quarter, followed by similar steps next year until a more-neutral level is reached, probably in the 2% area.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong>CEE: <\/strong> We forecast EU-CEE economies will grow by 2.6% in 2024, helped by private consumption and public investment amid EU transfers, and by 3% in 2025, when foreign demand and capex are likely to rebound. We expect GDP to grow by 3.2% in 2024 and 4.0% in 2025 in Turkey, and by 2.8% in 2024 and 1.3% in 2025 in Russia as the fiscal impulse fades and real monetary conditions remain tight. Central banks in Czechia, Hungary and Russia will likely cut rates this year, while those in Poland and Turkey could start easing in 2025.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong>UK: <\/strong> GDP will likely broadly stagnate this year (-0.3%) followed by modest growth in 2025 (0.8%). The labor market is clearly deteriorating, and household savings buffers have been exhausted. The Spring Budget tax cuts are unlikely to change this. Inflation will fall below 2% in April, with core inflation easing to around 2.5% in 2H24. We expect the BoE to cut the bank rate by 75bp this year, starting in August, and by 175bp next year.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong>China: <\/strong> We confirm our GDP growth forecast of 4.5% for 2024 and 4.3% in 2025, down from 5.2% in 2023. Although the National People\u2019s Congress set a growth target of \u201caround 5%\u201d for 2024, in line with last year, we believe that low consumer confidence, high youth unemployment, timid policy support across the board, a bloated real estate sector and an unfavorable geopolitical context will weigh on China\u2019s economic performance. The PBoC will likely continue to recalibrate different lending facilities at the margin.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":"","hash":"06261aa6f7c2c702da46fc3167e51a8814508634daf9d94fabb8d1ef595da48e","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"detailed","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"1","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M y","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"300","synopsisexpand":"1","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

Loading...

CEE Quarterly

b9bfa7b16d127980395cf2fc0409bc0818f1304019df1145b868cfa87b8a0783;;[{"layout":"detailed","uid":2684,"publicationDate":"26 Mar 24","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2024_186322.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRogQctIGg1LN12ZNTCUbMnkg==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2024_186408.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRo0doinh1HNldWMdC5AfATJw==&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - Adjustment postponed in auspicious environment (2Q24)","titleDe":"CEE Quarterly - Anpassung in ein g\u00fcnstiges Umfeld verschoben","titleIt":"","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>We expect the EU-CEE economies to grow by around 2.6% in 2024 and 3.0% 2025, with the Western Balkans growing marginally faster. We expect GDP to grow by 3.2% in 2024 and 4.0% in 2025 in Turkey and by 2.8% in 2024 and 1.3% in 2025 in Russia.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Private consumption is likely to lead the growth rebound, helped by faster real wage growth, rising borrowing and government transfers. Public investment will be the second-largest growth driver, while net exports will drag on GDP dynamics this year.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>We see budget deficits of less than 3% of GDP in 2024-25 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia and Serbia, with deficits of more than 5% in Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Romania (all at risk of excessive deficit procedures), as well as Turkey.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>We expect pro-EU parties to win more than two thirds of EU-CEE seats in the European Parliament, thereafter claiming more important positions in European institutions and NATO.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>We see a trade-off between lower budget deficits and higher inflation in Poland, Romania and Turkey, where we expect inflation targets to be missed in 2024-25. In Hungary, this trade-off could be postponed beyond 2025.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>We expect rate cuts this year in Czechia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Russia, although the pace of easing could slow in 2H24 and 2025 if currencies come under pressure. We expect the NBP and the CBRT to remain on hold this year, catching up in 2025.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Stable capital flows will cover C\/A deficits in all CEE countries except Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania and Turkey, where additional funding will come from international financial institutions, sovereign external borrowing and private borrowing from abroad, respectively.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Enlargement momentum is accelerating, with the Western Balkans likely to benefit if reforms are implemented. The accession process could also bode well for rating upgrades.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>In our view, the main risks are 1. a test to NATO\u2019s resilience following a lopsided peace in Ukraine, 2. more trade protectionism and lower risk appetite for EM assets if Donald Trump is elected US president, 3. low reform momentum after elections amid voter disengagement, 4. Bulgaria\u2019s probable early elections postponing euro adoption to 2026 and 5. limited EU transfers to Hungary and Slovakia due to standoff with EU institutions.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>\u00dcbersetzung der englischen Originalversion vom 26. M\u00e4rz 2024<\/p><\/p><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Wir erwarten, dass die Volkswirtschaften in der EU-CEE-Region im Jahr 2024 um ca. 2,6% und 2025 um 3,0% wachsen werden, wobei die westlichen Balkanl\u00e4nder geringf\u00fcgig schneller wachsen d\u00fcrften. F\u00fcr die T\u00fcrkei erwarten wir ein BIP-Wachstum von 3,2% im Jahr 2024 und 4,0% im Jahr 2025 und f\u00fcr Russland von 2,8% im Jahr 2024 und 1,3% im Jahr 2025.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Der private Verbrauch wird voraussichtlich die Wachstumsbelebung anf\u00fchren, unterst\u00fctzt durch ein schnelleres Reallohnwachstum, eine steigende Kreditaufnahme und staatliche Transfers. Die \u00f6ffentlichen Investitionen werden der zweitwichtigste Wachstumsmotor sein, w\u00e4hrend die Nettoexporte die BIP-Dynamik in diesem Jahr bremsen d\u00fcrften.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>F\u00fcr Bosnien-Herzegowina, Bulgarien, Kroatien, Tschechien und Serbien sehen wir f\u00fcr 2024-25 Haushaltsdefizite von weniger als 3% des BIP, f\u00fcr Ungarn, die Slowakei, Polen und Rum\u00e4nien (alle mit dem Risiko \u00fcberm\u00e4\u00dfiger Defizitverfahren) sowie die T\u00fcrkei dagegen Defizite von mehr als 5%.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Wir erwarten, dass die pro-EU-Parteien mehr als zwei Drittel der EU-CEE-Sitze im Europ\u00e4ischen Parlament gewinnen werden und danach mehr wichtige Positionen in den europ\u00e4ischen Institutionen und der NATO einnehmen werden.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Wir sehen einen Zielkonflikt zwischen niedrigeren Haushaltsdefiziten und h\u00f6herer Inflation in Polen, Rum\u00e4nien und der T\u00fcrkei, wo wir davon ausgehen, dass die Inflationsziele in den Jahren 2024-25 verfehlt werden. In Ungarn k\u00f6nnte sich dieser Zielkonflikt \u00fcber das Jahr 2025 hinaus verz\u00f6gern.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Wir erwarten Zinssenkungen in diesem Jahr in Tschechien, Ungarn, Rum\u00e4nien, Serbien und Russland, obwohl sich das Tempo der Lockerung in 2H24 und 2025 verlangsamen k\u00f6nnte, wenn die W\u00e4hrungen unter Druck geraten. Wir gehen davon aus, dass die NBP und die CBRT in diesem Jahr ihre Zinss\u00e4tze beibehalten und 2025 nachziehen werden.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Stabile Kapitalstr\u00f6me werden die Leistungsbilanzdefizite in allen CEE-L\u00e4ndern decken, mit der Ausnahme von Bosnien-Herzegowina, Rum\u00e4nien und der T\u00fcrkei, wo zus\u00e4tzliche Mittel von internationalen Finanzinstitutionen, staatlicher Auslandsverschuldung bzw. privater Kreditaufnahme aus dem Ausland kommen werden.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Die Erweiterungsdynamik beschleunigt sich, und die westlichen Balkanl\u00e4nder d\u00fcrften davon profitieren, wenn die Reformen umgesetzt werden. Der Beitrittsprozess k\u00f6nnte auch ein gutes Zeichen f\u00fcr die Anhebung der Ratings sein.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Unserer Ansicht nach sind die Hauptrisiken 1. ein Test f\u00fcr die Widerstandsf\u00e4higkeit der NATO nach einem einseitigen Frieden in der Ukraine, 2. mehr Handelsprotektionismus und geringere Risikobereitschaft f\u00fcr EM-Assets, falls Donald Trump zum US-Pr\u00e4sidenten gew\u00e4hlt wird, 3. eine geringe Reformdynamik nach den Wahlen aufgrund von W\u00e4hlerverdrossenheit, 4. wahrscheinlich vorgezogene Wahlen in Bulgarien, die die Euro-Einf\u00fchrung auf 2026 verschieben, und 5. begrenzte EU-Transfers an Ungarn und die Slowakei aufgrund der Blockade mit den EU-Institutionen.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","synopsisIt":"","hash":"b9bfa7b16d127980395cf2fc0409bc0818f1304019df1145b868cfa87b8a0783","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"detailed","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"1","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M y","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"300","synopsisexpand":"1","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

Loading...

Rates Perspectives

68e0975f705ae59b8d351f0efa82fb1fd8bbf8a7022a795e24603fdb86eaa613;;[{"layout":"detailed","uid":2646,"publicationDate":"18 Mar 24","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2024_186278.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVLpiMgg59M4jdsxFQmpUVOyxV7NMRbsTDA==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Rates Perspectives - Term premium estimates: are they useful for investment decisions?","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"Rates Perspectives","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The term premium is a very useful concept in theory but, in practice, it is unobservable and needs to be estimated. This can be a hurdle for practical applications. In this note, we analyze the extent to which the term premium estimates can help to forecast excess return for bonds.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The term premium has been positively correlated with realized excess return for a buy-and-hold strategy, although the relationship is relatively modest. The decline in interest rates from 1999 until 2016 may lead to an overestimation of the contribution of term premium to realized excess return.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Periods when the term premium increases are associated with negative returns from duration risk.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We analyze the term premium across maturities and find that, historically, duration extension pays off the most up to the 7Y area. Beyond this tenor, improvements in risk premium tend to be less than proportional relative to duration risk.<\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":"","hash":"68e0975f705ae59b8d351f0efa82fb1fd8bbf8a7022a795e24603fdb86eaa613","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"detailed","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"1","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M y","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"300","synopsisexpand":"1","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

Loading...

Chart of the Week

0bb45640d7a3b9f543d6cd4b201508bd1f189e18ef45ab0df510076e127eadd7;;[{"layout":"detailed","uid":2800,"publicationDate":"26 Apr 24","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2024_186444.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJMfHK85BPUzZPFqU10d6VCE=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - The hidden Iran-China oil trade","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\"><\/p><\/p><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>US President Joe Biden recently signed into law the package on Iran oil sanctions, also known as \u201cStop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act\u201d. The legislative package is a response to the airborne attack against Israel that was recently launched by Teheran for the killing of Iranian military officials in Syria. The measures toughen existing sanctions on Iran\u2019s oil sector, targeting foreign ports, vessels and refineries that knowingly process or ship Iranian crude. In addition, the legislation expands secondary sanctions covering all transactions between Chinese financial institutions and sanctioned Iranian banks.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p><\/p><\/p><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>Our Chart of the Week shows that the enforcement of existing sanctions has been poor. Since 2018, when Washington departed from the nuclear deal with Teheran and adopted a strategy of \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d, China\u2019s official imports of Iranian crude have been insignificant. But imports from Malaysia have picked up massively since then. At the moment, they are close to 1.1mb\/d \u2013 that is more than 500kb\/d above the production capacity of the country. According to the Energy Information Agency, China rebrands Iranian oil as originating from Malaysia (but also from the UAE or Oman), moving oil from ship to ship to camouflage the origin of the commodity. In turn, as reported by Bloomberg, Beijing uses small financial institutions to facilitate this commerce and shelter large financial entities, while leveraging the yuan-based Cross-Border Interbank System to clear transactions instead of SWIFT. The economic gain for China is represented by sizable price discounts, especially for small, semi-independent refineries known as teapots, while the strategic one is represented by reinforcing diplomatic ties with Teheran. <\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li>The lack of sanction enforcement goes beyond the China-Malaysia trade. Iranian oil production peaked in 2018 at around 3.8mb\/d and troughed at 1.9mb\/d in 2020. Since then, it has continued to increase, hitting 3.2mb\/d last March. As described in detail by the Middle East Institute, this additional output is shipped across the world through a variety of tactics to evade sanctions. So far, as noted by the Congressional Research Service, the US has turned a blind eye to this illegal trade in order to limit oil-price spikes and inflationary pressures following the curtailing of Russian oil exports in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. In addition, the Biden administration was willing to reduce somewhat the pressure on Teheran to resume talks on its nuclear program. There are also legal issues that constrain the Biden administration because the law of the sea limits the enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil at sea such as confiscating a vessel. With the November presidential election approaching, it remains to be seen how willing President Biden will be to enforce this new package of sanctions, considering how inflation has weighed on his popularity, clouding a positive economic growth track-record.<\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":"","hash":"0bb45640d7a3b9f543d6cd4b201508bd1f189e18ef45ab0df510076e127eadd7","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"detailed","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"1","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M y","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"300","synopsisexpand":"1","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

Loading...

Sunday Wrap

5134f6204bc716c62b276fe8515f5767ed0bb90f2e6bae23c68785527a4cdfd4;;[{"layout":"detailed","uid":2774,"publicationDate":"21 Apr 24","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2024_186416.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJMfHK85BPUzZbV9BSVBOBB8=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Sunday Wrap","titleDe":"","titleIt":"","product":"Sunday Wrap","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Geopolitics is indeed bad. US-China relations are deteriorating rapidly as economic policies adjust to support the national security concerns.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The risk of a Trump victory in November and what it may mean for the US and the world. Spoiler: Not good!<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The economic outlook is fundamentally more uncertain than at any time during the 40 years I have come to IMF annual and spring meetings. Discussions about economic policies often seemed disjointed. A few observations on particularly US fiscal and European monetary policies.<\/li><\/ul>","synopsisDe":"","synopsisIt":"","hash":"5134f6204bc716c62b276fe8515f5767ed0bb90f2e6bae23c68785527a4cdfd4","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"detailed","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"1","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M y","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"300","synopsisexpand":"1","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

Loading...