e2fda6f48f4beb7f2e9a16bde35b727c4d7cd8e0d73c422d49e7378ade652268;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":25935,"publicationDate":"29 Jul 15:11","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180844.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJMbnchgdNKueNhOXGk6Ecd8=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - Long-term inflation expectations in the US remain well-anchored ","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In June, 12-month CPI inflation rose to 5.4% in the US, its highest level since 2008. Rising inflationary pressures are linked to the reopening of the economy and the associated release of pent-up demand amid strong support from fiscal policy, and to supply bottlenecks (due to shortages of labor, commodities, and key intermediate inputs). We expect these forces to be temporary as demand fades and supply adjusts. But the higher and longer actual inflation rises, the more inflation expectations could be affected, forcing central banks to intervene and tighten their monetary policy stance. Given the role played by inflation expectations in the wage and price setting process, they have the potential to become self-fulfilling. In other words, they can serve as an 'accelerator' for inflation of the effects of temporary demand and supply shocks. Our Chart of the Week\u00a0shows that while short-term inflation expectations have moved higher, longer-term inflation expectations remain in line with historical averages when inflation was around target.<\/li><li> Measures of inflation expectations, at least in the US, come in a great variety. Some look at the short term, others at the long term. Some are based on surveys of households, firms or professional forecasters that are conducted by several institutions; others are derived directly from prices of financial securities. Regardless of the type, inflation expectations five years ahead and beyond look consistently well-anchored; in 2Q21, they were roughly in line with past averages. <\/li><li> Short-term inflation expectations, particularly of consumers compiled in surveys like those of the Conference Board and the University of Michigan, have been affected somewhat by the current inflationary spike ' but, historically, short-term inflation expectations have always been higher than long-term ones. Professional forecasters, instead, are looking through today\u00b4s volatility. This rise in short-term inflation expectations for households is not particularly surprising or concerning. Most people use simple rules of thumb to determine what they feel is the evolution of prices, such as the cost of food or petrol ' things they purchase frequently ' or their views about inflation are influenced by the media reporting information about current prices. That is why short-term inflation expectations of households tend to follow actual inflation higher (so-called 'adaptive' expectations). Importantly, however, households do not expect rising inflation to be lasting.<\/li><\/ul>","hash":"e2fda6f48f4beb7f2e9a16bde35b727c4d7cd8e0d73c422d49e7378ade652268","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","synopsislength":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","nolinktitle":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"12"}},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25926,"publicationDate":"28 Jul 11:35","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2021_180834.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRowVR_C5Bsx474E54GL3660g==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - Die Wiederer\u00f6ffnung (3Q21)","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"\u00dcbersetzung der englischen Originalversion vom 30. Juni 2021<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wir erwarten, dass die Volkswirtschaften in der EU-CEE -Region und auf dem Westbalkan nach einem Einbruch von knapp 4% im Jahr 2020 im Jahr 2021 um rund 5% und im Jahr 2022 um 4,5% wachsen werden. Wir sehen Ungarn, Polen, Rum\u00e4nien und Serbien bereits 2021 auf das Niveau vor der Pandemie zur\u00fcckkehren, die anderen L\u00e4nder folgen 2022.<\/li><li> Die aufgestaute Nachfrage k\u00f6nnte die Erholung vorantreiben, nachdem die Verbraucher und Unternehmen ihre Ersparnisse im Jahr 2020 erh\u00f6ht hatten. Staatliche Transfers werden die Haushaltsfinanzen weiter unterst\u00fctzen. Vorfinanzierungen aus dem EU-Programm f\u00fcr Wiederaufbau und Stabilit\u00e4t (RRF = Recovery and Resilience Fund) k\u00f6nnten ab 3Q21 eintreffen und die Investitionen weiter ankurbeln.<\/li><li> Die t\u00fcrkische Wirtschaft d\u00fcrfte 2021 um 7,5% wachsen, das schnellste Wachstum in der CEE-Region, nachdem 2020 eine Rezession vermieden werden konnte. Im Jahr 2022 k\u00f6nnte sich das Wachstum auf 3,5% verlangsamen, wenn die Finanzierungsbedingungen angespannt bleiben.<\/li><li> Es wird erwartet, dass die russische Wirtschaft in diesem Jahr um etwa 3,4% und im n\u00e4chsten Jahr um 2,6% wachsen wird und damit alle Pandemieverluste wieder wettmachen kann. Die Inlandsnachfrage d\u00fcrfte steigen, da die Haushalte ihre Ersparnisse reduzieren und die Unternehmen wieder investieren. <\/li><li> Im Jahr 2021 wird die Erholung im Sommer vermutlich vom Dienstleistungssektor getragen, der w\u00e4hrend der Schlie\u00dfungen am meisten gelitten hatte. Die anschlie\u00dfende Erholung k\u00f6nnte holprig verlaufen, da alle Sektoren mit einem Arbeitskr\u00e4ftemangel zu k\u00e4mpfen haben. Das verarbeitende Gewerbe, das die wirtschaftliche Erholung seit dem letzten Sommer angef\u00fchrt hatte und das Baugewerbe sehen sich zus\u00e4tzlich mit Engp\u00e4ssen in der Lieferkette konfrontiert, die ihr Wachstum verlangsamen werden. <\/li><li> In der ganzen CEE-Region besteht das Hauptrisiko f\u00fcr das Wachstum in einem weiteren Anstieg der COVID-19-Infektionen und Todesf\u00e4lle sp\u00e4ter im Jahr 2021, da die Geschwindigkeit der Impfungen seit Mai nachgelassen hat. Bulgarien, Russland und Rum\u00e4nien sind in dieser Hinsicht st\u00e4rker bedroht als Tschechien, die T\u00fcrkei, Polen, Ungarn, Slowenien und die Slowakei. <\/li><li> Angebotsschocks und eine st\u00e4rkere Nachfrage werden die Inflation voraussichtlich nach oben treiben. Die Dynamik der zyklischen Inflation nimmt weiter zu, w\u00e4hrend die Rohstoffpreise ab jetzt weniger zur Inflation beitragen d\u00fcrften. Tschechien und Serbien sind die einzigen L\u00e4nder, die in diesem Jahr die Inflationsziele erreichen d\u00fcrften. Im n\u00e4chsten Jahr wird die st\u00e4rkere Inlandsnachfrage die Inflation au\u00dferhalb oder nahe am oberen Rand der Zielbereiche halten.<\/li><li> Wir erwarten weitere Zinserh\u00f6hungen in diesem Jahr, auf 1,35% in Ungarn, 1,00% in Tschechien und 6,5% in Russland. Die NBP k\u00f6nnte in 4Q21 oder 1Q22 mit Zinserh\u00f6hungen beginnen und den Leitzins auf 1,5% anheben. Die NBR wird den Leitzins im Jahr 2022 voraussichtlich auf 1,75-2% anheben. Die CBRT d\u00fcrfte den Leitzins in diesem Jahr um 2,5 Pp. und im n\u00e4chsten Jahr um 3 Pp. auf 13,5% senken, w\u00e4hrend die CBR ebenfalls eine Senkung auf 5,5% vornehmen k\u00f6nnte. <\/li><li> Die Hauptrisiken sind inl\u00e4ndischer Natur und beziehen sich haupts\u00e4chlich auf die Politik. Die Wahlen in Bulgarien und Tschechien k\u00f6nnten zu fragilen Mehrheiten f\u00fchren. Unstimmigkeiten zwischen den slowakischen Regierungsparteien werden vermutlich Reformen verz\u00f6gern. Ein F\u00fchrungsstreit in der Partei der Liberalen k\u00f6nnte zu einer Umgestaltung der rum\u00e4nischen Regierung f\u00fchren. Politische Einmischung bleibt das gr\u00f6\u00dfte Risiko f\u00fcr die Geldpolitik in der T\u00fcrkei. In 3Q21 k\u00f6nnte die geopolitische Risikopr\u00e4mie auf russische Finanzanlagen abnehmen. <\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25841,"publicationDate":"18 Jul 13:53","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180738.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJHjzm7tW87Ye4eNNQ_bVVzs=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180738.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJHjzm7tW87Ye4eNNQ_bVVzs=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180738.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJHjzm7tW87Ye4eNNQ_bVVzs=&T=1&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> I\u00b4ll revisit the ECB\u00b4s post-strategy-publication media blitz to explain and persuade the public ahead of Thursday\u00b4s Governing Council meeting that they\u00b4ll act 'forcefully and persistently' to achieve the revised inflation target ' raising expectations in the process. And I note the decision to take the digital euro project a step further.<\/li><li> As summer rolls in and most of the OECD economies show strong growth, the debate about the withdrawal of policy stimulus is picking up on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, there is still a long way back for a full recovery in Europe and the list of unanswered questions about the strength and sustainability of the path back to recovery is long. I\u00b4ll summarize my seven key questions ' and, as a summer-special, I\u00b4ll illustrate them with a set of attached charts. To me the conclusion is clear: Any reduction in European policy stimulus would be a mistake. If you disagree after having read my note and looked at the charts, do write to me!<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25821,"publicationDate":"14 Jul 15:55","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180711.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJHjzm7tW87YeLMLSmjPLpDw=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - Owner-occupied housing in eurozone HICP: Implications and challenges","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> With its strategy review, the ECB confirmed that the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) remains the appropriate measure for assessing the achievement of the central bank\u00b4s new price-stability objective (a symmetric target of 2% inflation over the medium term). However, the Governing Council (GC) acknowledged that 'the inclusion of the costs related to owner-occupied housing in the HICP would better represent the inflation rate that is relevant for households'. Therefore, it recommended a roadmap to include owner-occupied housing (OOH) in the HICP. <\/li><li> Our Chart of the Week shows an attempt to quantify the effects of including OOH in the eurozone HICP. We make a (possibly conservative) assumption that the weight of OOH in the basket would be 10%. Over the last decade, the inclusion of OOH would have raised inflation by an average of 0.1pp per year, although the impact would have differed meaningfully over time. In 2011-13, amid weakness in the housing market, OOH subtracted from the inflation rate, while the opposite holds true in the following years, when inflation would have been 0.2pp higher, on average. This suggests two things. First, the slight increase in the target for inflation, under the new definition of price stability (to 2% from 'below, but close to 2%') changes very little in practice when OOH is taken into account. Second, inflation that includes OOH might become more pro-cyclical. Using a larger weight for OOH does not materially alter the average results, but obviously increases the cyclicality of inflation. <\/li><li> OOH is a tricky concept, as it reflects the costs of purchasing, maintaining and living in one\u00b4s own home. Currently, housing costs in the eurozone mainly enter the HICP through actual rents, with a weight of 6.5%, while the costs of OOH are not included. The perception by eurozone households, which we share, is that the weight of the cost of housing in the HICP basket is too low. Several advanced countries already include OOH in their inflation gauges. As a reference, in US CPI, the weight of actual rents is about 8%, while OOH accounts for most housing costs through the so-called owners\u00b4 equivalent rent, with a weight of about 24%. In the UK, the weight of costs of OOH in the CPI basket is about 16%. The main obstacle for OOH inclusion in the eurozone HICP is measurement issues, including differences in data availability and methodology in the way OOH is calculated by member states\u00b4 national statistics offices. Also, OOH data are currently published with a relatively long lag ' numbers for 1Q21 have only been recently published.<\/li><li> The ECB\u00b4s roadmap foresees four main stages for moving to an HICP including OOH costs as the main index for monetary policy purposes: 1. The construction of an analytical index for internal purposes, which includes OOH with approximated weights; 2 Eurostat to carry out further work on the statistical compilation of OOH weights, with the aim of publishing an experimental quarterly HICP including OOH costs in 2023; 3. An official quarterly index to be available by 2026; 4. OOH costs to be included in the HICP at a monthly frequency and in a timely manner (the ECB does not provide a timetable for this). During the transition period until stage 4 is accomplished, the main reference index for monetary policy will remain the current HICP, although 'the quarterly OOH index will play an important supplementary role in assessing the impact of housing costs on inflation and will thus inform the GC\u00b4s monetary policy assessments'.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25788,"publicationDate":"11 Jul 12:38","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180671.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJFXNmya2TWN3FxbVPMU3H1o=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180671.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJFXNmya2TWN3FxbVPMU3H1o=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180671.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJFXNmya2TWN3FxbVPMU3H1o=&T=1&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> The ECB\u00b4s new strategy: <\/strong> The disappointment, the worrying central outlook - and the (distant) hope.<\/li><li> The flat ECB strategy raises the bar for fiscal policy, for which the 2022 budgets and the future shape of the EU\u00b4s fiscal rules will be key. There\u00b4ll be no clarity on EU fiscal rules until we have the next German government in place. I\u00b4ll discuss the outlook for German politics.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25760,"publicationDate":"07 Jul 11:47","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180640.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJFXNmya2TWN38myvSDvtQLQ=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - OPEC+: Why the UAE has blocked a deal","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> After days of tense diplomatic negotiations, last Monday OPEC+ failed to strike an agreement on the tapering of its oil curbs. Russia and Saudi Arabia had proposed to raise output collectively by 400,000 b\/d each month, between August and December 2021, while extending the existing deal (of around 3mb\/d in production curbs) from April 2022 until December 2022. However, the UAE blocked the deal, deeming it unfair. The UAE supported the easing of the collective production cuts through the end of the year but wanted the extension of the agreement to be discussed at a separate occasion because its quota is calculated according to outdated production capacity figures that impose a heavy cost on the country in terms of lost government revenues. For Saudi Arabia and Russia, instead, the two issues were linked and could not be separated. At the moment, the cartel does not envisage boosting output in August, and no details have been released about a possible new date to finalize a deal. <\/li><li> Our Chart of the Week, which reports spare production capacity as a percent of total capacity under the current deal, shows that the UAE has a valid argument. When, in spring 2020, OPEC+ agreed to cut production by 9.7mn b\/d, national quotas were tied to 2018 production levels ' except for Russia, which was assigned a baseline that was some 600,000 b\/d higher and thus could cut less, in percentage terms, than it was supposed to. The UAE was heavily penalized by the choice, because, in 2018, its production capacity was around 3.2mn b\/d, as opposed to around 3.8mn b\/d now. The expansion in production capacity is a result of a series of investments that are expected to increase output to around 5mn b\/d by 2030. As a result, the UAE is now sacrificing 31% of its capacity ' the highest such percentage among OPEC+ members, even though it is only a mid-sized producer. If the 2018 baseline for production capacity were used instead, the country would just be forgoing 17% of its capacity ' roughly in line with other countries. <\/li><li> The chart highlights the overall unevenness of the deal. Not all countries are expected to give up the same percentage of production capacity. Among the largest producers, Russia is sacrificing less than 10% of its overall output, as opposed to 30% for Saudi Arabia. Even if Russia and Saudi Arabia are both producing 9.5mn b\/d, the relative cost of the agreement is higher for the latter. For the other members of the cartel, the percentages range from 4% for Angola to 22% for Nigeria. The chart also shows that there is room to rebalance the UAE\u00b4s quota, but it would require other members to contribute more to the deal. For the UAE to have a percentage of unused production capacity similar to Kuwait or Iraq (two other mid-sized producers), its production should be increased by 400,000 b\/d (which is the amount of additional production for the whole group that was planned for August).<\/li><li> Defusing the diplomatic impasse and finding common ground is unlikely to be easy. The current stalemate is rooted in disagreement over the way quotas are calculated. The UAE see this as an opportunity to reassert itself from its long-standing but dominant ally Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the two countries are currently distant on a number of regional issues. In 2019, the UAE withdrew most of its military forces from Yemen, while Saudi Arabia remained to fight Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Among many issues, the two countries have different positions with regard to the normalization of relations with Israel and Qatar. Despite the heightened competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, we expect an agreement to be reached in the coming weeks ' even if its shape is hard to predict. Otherwise, the costs would be too high for the cartel itself. Without an injection of some extra barrels of oil by the middle of the summer, and given the tightness of the market, Brent might cross the threshold of USD 80\/bbl, risking endangering global demand. However, if tensions were to escalate, inducing producers to pump freely, prices would move sharply in the opposite direction, paving the way for a price war reminiscent of the one that occurred last year. <\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25727,"publicationDate":"04 Jul 12:45","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180596.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJELjWQr-cDcAGx3T0Am-PZc=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180596.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJELjWQr-cDcAGx3T0Am-PZc=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180596.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJELjWQr-cDcAGx3T0Am-PZc=&T=1&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The outlook for strong ' but diverging - growth in the second half of the year, and the teeing up of the withdrawal of policy stimulus in Europe.<\/li><li> My two key questions for European policymakers.<\/li><li> What this is likely to mean for markets during the next six months.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25726,"publicationDate":"02 Jul 16:37","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180595.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJELjWQr-cDcADT8hnFz8mpQ=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - US labor market: Progress, but not substantial","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In the US, non-farm payrolls rose a better than expected 850k in June, after an upward-revised 583k in the prior month. Payrolls are still 6.8 million (or 4.4%) below their pre-COVID level in February 2020. Despite the acceleration in payroll gains in June, the headline unemployment rate actually rose 0.1pp to 5.9%, and the labor force participation rate was unchanged at 61.6%.<\/li><li> Our Chart of the Week shows that, while the pace of job growth is accelerating, there remains plenty of slack in the labor market, once one adjusts for the misclassification of workers and, in particular, the large number of Americans that have left the labor force since the onset of the pandemic in February 2020. Once these adjustments are made, the real unemployment rate was 8.9% in June, unchanged from May, and well above the pre-COVID level of 3.5%. The Fed is likely to judge ' rightly ' that it has made progress towards its maximum employment goal, but not the 'substantial further progress' it has set before tapering the pace of asset purchases. We expect the Fed to announce in December that tapering will start in January 2022.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25724,"publicationDate":"02 Jul 15:33","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180593.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJELjWQr-cDcAO5t8Z7lus0Q=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180612.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJFXNmya2TWN3br9iACdf1i8=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180610.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJFXNmya2TWN305vvL5ZdAxk=&T=1&T=1"},"title":"Oil Update - How good is the market at predicting oil prices?","product":"Oil Update","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Oil prices have rebounded sharply over the last few months. The big unknown now is whether the price recovery will soon run out of steam or not.<\/li><li> We look at the futures to discuss a possible direction for oil prices for the next 12 months. They currently point to a sizable decline in prices in the coming quarters. <\/li><li> Contrary to super-cycle arguments, we side with futures that are consistent with a scenario of under-supply today, more than excessive demand tomorrow. <\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25701,"publicationDate":"30 Jun 17:05","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2021_180566.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRoSIN084bMP6FuoAhlg8moqA==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2021_180834.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRowVR_C5Bsx474E54GL3660g==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - The reopening (3Q21)","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect economies in EU-CEE and in the Western Balkans, to grow by around 5% in 2021 and 4.5% in 2022 after slumping by close to 4% in 2020. We see Hungary, Poland, Romania and Serbia returning to pre-pandemic levels of activity already in 2021, with the other countries following in 2022.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Pent-up demand could drive the recovery, as consumers and companies increased their savings in 2020. Government transfers will further support household finances. Pre-funding from the EU\u00b4s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) might start arriving in 3Q21, further boosting investment.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Turkey\u00b4s economy could grow by 7.5% in 2021, the fastest in CEE, after avoiding a recession in 2020. In 2022, growth might slow to 3.5% if financial conditions remain tight.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The Russian economy is expected to grow by around 3.4% this year and 2.6% next year, recouping all pandemic losses. Domestic demand could increase as households reduce their savings and companies start investing again.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In 2021, the summer rebound will be driven by services, which suffered the most during lockdowns. The subsequent recovery could be bumpy, as all sectors face labor shortages. Manufacturing, which led the economic rebound since last summer, and construction also face supply-chain bottlenecks that will slow their growth.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Throughout CEE, the main risk to growth is another spike in COVID-19 cases and deaths later in 2021 as the speed of vaccination has slowed since May. Bulgaria, Russia and Romania face bigger threats in this respect than Czechia, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Supply shocks and stronger demand are expected to push inflation higher. The momentum in cyclical inflation continues to rise, while commodity prices may contribute less to inflation from here on. Czechia and Serbia are the only countries likely to hit inflation targets this year. Next year, stronger domestic demand will keep inflation outside or close to the top of target ranges.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect additional rate hikes this year, to 1.35% in Hungary, 1.00% in Czechia and 6.5% in Russia. The NBP could start raising rates in 4Q21 or 1Q22, taking the policy rate to 1.5%. The NBR could take the key rate to 1.75-2% in 2022. The CBRT could cut the policy rate by 2.5pp this year and 3pp next year, to 13.5%, with the CBR cutting as well, to 5.5%.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The main risks are domestic and mostly related to politics. Elections in Bulgaria and Czechia could result in fragile majorities. Infighting among Slovakia\u00b4s governing parties could delay reforms. A leadership contest in the Liberal party could reshape the Romanian government. Political interference remains the biggest risk for monetary policy in Turkey. In 3Q21, the geopolitical risk premium on Russian financial assets could diminish.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25700,"publicationDate":"30 Jun 16:22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180565.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJELjWQr-cDcAAyiEAIaqX5Y=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Economics Chartbook - Recovery strengthens, price pressures won\u00b4t last (3Q21)","product":"The Unicredit Economics Chartbook","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Global: <\/strong> We are revising up our global GDP growth forecast for this year slightly to 6.1% (from 5.8%) while our estimate for next year is broadly unchanged at 4.6%. The upward revision reflects stronger near-term consumption growth in several advanced economies. In contrast, the recovery in several major emerging markets has slowed. Downside risks remain from new variants. Supply bottlenecks and strengthening demand as economies reopen have led to surging input prices and some pass-through to consumer prices, but will very likely be temporary. The major central banks are likely to look through it.<\/li><li><strong> US: <\/strong> The economy is expanding rapidly and GDP growth will likely be slightly stronger than previously expected, at 6.6% this year (from 6.4%) and 3.8% next year (from 3.7%). Output is set to exceed its pre-pandemic trend already in 4Q21. We are also raising our CPI inflation forecast for this year, to 3.9% from 3.3%, reflecting higher recent outturns and ongoing demand-supply imbalances into the autumn. However, inflation will likely return to just above 2% by end-2022. We expect Congress to pass a longer-term economic plan with additional spending worth USD 2-3tn over the next decade, partly financed by USD 1tn in higher taxes. The Fed will likely announce in December that tapering will start in January 2022 and last around a year. Fed rate hikes are likely to be gradual, beginning in late 2023, with risks skewed towards an earlier hike.<\/li><li><strong> Eurozone: <\/strong> We are increasing our GDP growth forecast for this year to 4.5% from 4.0%, leaving the estimate for 2022 at 4.3%. We now see GDP reaching its pre-pandemic level in 1Q22. The services sector is recovering, while manufacturing activity remains solid, despite supply shortages and surging production costs. We forecast average CPI inflation of 2% this year, with a peak at 2.5-3% in autumn, followed by a slowdown to 1.5% in 2022 amid muted core inflation and base effects. The future of the PEPP after March hangs in the balance. Its phasing-out would pose challenges to the ECB, given the need to preserve sizeable stimulus and a smooth transmission in all jurisdictions while underlying inflation remains well below target. This would require a substantial beefing-up of the standard QE program, an increase of its flexibility along the lines of the PEPP, and enhanced forward guidance for reinvestments.<\/li><li><strong> CEE: <\/strong> GDP in EU-CEE and in the Western Balkans will likely grow by about 5% in 2021 and 4.5% in 2022. Having avoided a recession in 2020, Turkey\u00b4s economy could expand by 7.5% in 2021 and slow to 3.5% in 2022 if financial conditions remain tight. Russia\u00b4s GDP is expected to grow by 3.4% this year and 2.6% next year. Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Serbia could return to pre-pandemic levels of activity in 2021, with the other countries following in 2022. Pent-up demand, government transfers and lower savings rates are likely to drive the recovery. Pre-funding from NGEU might start arriving in 3Q21, further boosting investment. We expect additional rate hikes this year in Hungary, Czechia and Russia. The NBP might start raising rates in 4Q21 or 1Q22, followed by the NBR in 2022. The CBRT is likely to cut rates in 2021-22 and the CBR in 2022.<\/li><li><strong> UK: <\/strong> We are revising up our GDP growth forecast for this year to 6.9% (from 6.0%) due to faster near-term growth, while leaving our forecast for 2022 broadly unchanged at 6.2%. Daily new COVID-19 cases are rising again but the vaccine rollout appears to have broken the link between cases and hospitalizations. We expect the MPC to leave monetary policy unchanged through 2022, but risks are skewed towards action before the end of next year.<\/li><li><strong> China: <\/strong> We confirm our GDP growth forecast of 8.5% for 2021 and 5.7% for 2022. After the sharp rebound in activity between 2Q20 and 4Q20, which was supported by a combination of ultra-easy monetary and fiscal policies, the Chinese economy is losing some momentum as the stimulus is gradually being removed. Inflation pressures have probably peaked.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":25664,"publicationDate":"25 Jun 16:33","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_180520.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJELjWQr-cDcAoI-js592JyY=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - US unemployment benefits may weigh on labor supply for some time","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\">US unemployment benefits may weigh on labor supply for some time<\/p>"}]

fca5774f669803887558f1f8bf49f8ba6cbad35f9de48a9f1720f5619f212128;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":25926,"publicationDate":"28 Jul 11:35","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2021_180834.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRowVR_C5Bsx474E54GL3660g==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - Die Wiederer\u00f6ffnung (3Q21)","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"\u00dcbersetzung der englischen Originalversion vom 30. Juni 2021<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Wir erwarten, dass die Volkswirtschaften in der EU-CEE -Region und auf dem Westbalkan nach einem Einbruch von knapp 4% im Jahr 2020 im Jahr 2021 um rund 5% und im Jahr 2022 um 4,5% wachsen werden. Wir sehen Ungarn, Polen, Rum\u00e4nien und Serbien bereits 2021 auf das Niveau vor der Pandemie zur\u00fcckkehren, die anderen L\u00e4nder folgen 2022.<\/li><li> Die aufgestaute Nachfrage k\u00f6nnte die Erholung vorantreiben, nachdem die Verbraucher und Unternehmen ihre Ersparnisse im Jahr 2020 erh\u00f6ht hatten. Staatliche Transfers werden die Haushaltsfinanzen weiter unterst\u00fctzen. Vorfinanzierungen aus dem EU-Programm f\u00fcr Wiederaufbau und Stabilit\u00e4t (RRF = Recovery and Resilience Fund) k\u00f6nnten ab 3Q21 eintreffen und die Investitionen weiter ankurbeln.<\/li><li> Die t\u00fcrkische Wirtschaft d\u00fcrfte 2021 um 7,5% wachsen, das schnellste Wachstum in der CEE-Region, nachdem 2020 eine Rezession vermieden werden konnte. Im Jahr 2022 k\u00f6nnte sich das Wachstum auf 3,5% verlangsamen, wenn die Finanzierungsbedingungen angespannt bleiben.<\/li><li> Es wird erwartet, dass die russische Wirtschaft in diesem Jahr um etwa 3,4% und im n\u00e4chsten Jahr um 2,6% wachsen wird und damit alle Pandemieverluste wieder wettmachen kann. Die Inlandsnachfrage d\u00fcrfte steigen, da die Haushalte ihre Ersparnisse reduzieren und die Unternehmen wieder investieren. <\/li><li> Im Jahr 2021 wird die Erholung im Sommer vermutlich vom Dienstleistungssektor getragen, der w\u00e4hrend der Schlie\u00dfungen am meisten gelitten hatte. Die anschlie\u00dfende Erholung k\u00f6nnte holprig verlaufen, da alle Sektoren mit einem Arbeitskr\u00e4ftemangel zu k\u00e4mpfen haben. Das verarbeitende Gewerbe, das die wirtschaftliche Erholung seit dem letzten Sommer angef\u00fchrt hatte und das Baugewerbe sehen sich zus\u00e4tzlich mit Engp\u00e4ssen in der Lieferkette konfrontiert, die ihr Wachstum verlangsamen werden. <\/li><li> In der ganzen CEE-Region besteht das Hauptrisiko f\u00fcr das Wachstum in einem weiteren Anstieg der COVID-19-Infektionen und Todesf\u00e4lle sp\u00e4ter im Jahr 2021, da die Geschwindigkeit der Impfungen seit Mai nachgelassen hat. Bulgarien, Russland und Rum\u00e4nien sind in dieser Hinsicht st\u00e4rker bedroht als Tschechien, die T\u00fcrkei, Polen, Ungarn, Slowenien und die Slowakei. <\/li><li> Angebotsschocks und eine st\u00e4rkere Nachfrage werden die Inflation voraussichtlich nach oben treiben. Die Dynamik der zyklischen Inflation nimmt weiter zu, w\u00e4hrend die Rohstoffpreise ab jetzt weniger zur Inflation beitragen d\u00fcrften. Tschechien und Serbien sind die einzigen L\u00e4nder, die in diesem Jahr die Inflationsziele erreichen d\u00fcrften. Im n\u00e4chsten Jahr wird die st\u00e4rkere Inlandsnachfrage die Inflation au\u00dferhalb oder nahe am oberen Rand der Zielbereiche halten.<\/li><li> Wir erwarten weitere Zinserh\u00f6hungen in diesem Jahr, auf 1,35% in Ungarn, 1,00% in Tschechien und 6,5% in Russland. Die NBP k\u00f6nnte in 4Q21 oder 1Q22 mit Zinserh\u00f6hungen beginnen und den Leitzins auf 1,5% anheben. Die NBR wird den Leitzins im Jahr 2022 voraussichtlich auf 1,75-2% anheben. Die CBRT d\u00fcrfte den Leitzins in diesem Jahr um 2,5 Pp. und im n\u00e4chsten Jahr um 3 Pp. auf 13,5% senken, w\u00e4hrend die CBR ebenfalls eine Senkung auf 5,5% vornehmen k\u00f6nnte. <\/li><li> Die Hauptrisiken sind inl\u00e4ndischer Natur und beziehen sich haupts\u00e4chlich auf die Politik. Die Wahlen in Bulgarien und Tschechien k\u00f6nnten zu fragilen Mehrheiten f\u00fchren. Unstimmigkeiten zwischen den slowakischen Regierungsparteien werden vermutlich Reformen verz\u00f6gern. Ein F\u00fchrungsstreit in der Partei der Liberalen k\u00f6nnte zu einer Umgestaltung der rum\u00e4nischen Regierung f\u00fchren. Politische Einmischung bleibt das gr\u00f6\u00dfte Risiko f\u00fcr die Geldpolitik in der T\u00fcrkei. In 3Q21 k\u00f6nnte die geopolitische Risikopr\u00e4mie auf russische Finanzanlagen abnehmen. <\/li><\/ul>","hash":"fca5774f669803887558f1f8bf49f8ba6cbad35f9de48a9f1720f5619f212128","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"-1","showcompanies":"-1","synopsislength":"-1","showcountries":"-1","showcurrencies":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]