e2fda6f48f4beb7f2e9a16bde35b727c4d7cd8e0d73c422d49e7378ade652268;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":23625,"publicationDate":"18 Oct 11:54","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178211.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJBa9DS-RyP7KSChJwg2b01Y=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178211.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJBa9DS-RyP7KSChJwg2b01Y=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178211.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJBa9DS-RyP7KSChJwg2b01Y=&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> On Brexit, I don\u2019t know if we\u2019ll get a deal before year-end, but I\u2019m convinced that one day we will get one. In the meantime, so much damage has been done to the UK\u2019s reputation \u2013 and unnecessary cost has been added to businesses because of the uncertainty.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Turning to the main topic of the IMF meetings, the second wave of the pandemic, I\u2019ll argue that the risk it poses to the (rather commonly agreed) GDP outlook may be relatively limited, but it still calls for urgent additional national fiscal support\u2026<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> and I\u2019ll summarise why you don\u2019t need to worry about the additional public debt.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","hash":"e2fda6f48f4beb7f2e9a16bde35b727c4d7cd8e0d73c422d49e7378ade652268","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","synopsislength":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","nolinktitle":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"12"}},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23530,"publicationDate":"11 Oct 11:27","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178137.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJC8J2iL5sf3nf816wjJYS4k=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178137.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJC8J2iL5sf3nf816wjJYS4k=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178137.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJC8J2iL5sf3nf816wjJYS4k=&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The signs of cooling domestic demand in Europe and the need for more stimulus. If you need a solid macro reason for such measures, recent numbers from the Bundesbank provide just that.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Trump seems to get increasingly desperate as he stands to lose the election on November 3. I\u2019ll summarize what he can (and probably will) do to create chaos after the election in his attempt to hang on to power (and prevent a return to his business, which increasingly has been revealed as a house of cards.) With American society deeply divided and increasingly disrespectful of each other, I worry about the risk of civil unrest.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23502,"publicationDate":"07 Oct 13:53","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178106.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJC8J2iL5sf3nYPu_5GcU4Aw=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - Central banks concerned about fiscal cliff effects","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Yesterday, ECB President Christine Lagarde sounded concerned that the latest restrictions to contain the spread of COVID-19 might derail the eurozone recovery, calling for a continuation of fiscal support to avoid the risk of cliff effects. On the other side of the Atlantic, Fed Chair Jerome Powell has been arguing for some time that the US economy needs further fiscal aid and markets certainly did not like it when Donald Trump announced yesterday that he was ending negotiations with the Democrats in Congress on a fiscal package. Our Chart of the Week highlights the key role played by government measures in supporting the purchasing power of eurozone households during the first wave of the pandemic.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The chart shows that over the two decades until the pandemic hit, the disposable income of eurozone households, a proxy for their purchasing power in nominal terms, moved hand in hand with labor compensation (including mixed income, i.e. self-employment income). This tight correlation remained intact during the credit and sovereign debt crises, but has broken down in the wake of COVID-19. The reason seems to be that although labor income was hit massively when many workers were put on furlough schemes, the ensuing drag on disposable income was largely mitigated by a strong increase in fiscal transfers and benefits, as well as automatic stabilizers (i.e. lower taxes) and tax deferrals.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The resilience of disposable income together with the collapse in mobility and spending caused by the lockdown also explains why the savings rate of eurozone households surged to almost 25% in 2Q20, twice the pre-pandemic level. The speed at which the savings rate returns to normal will be one of the most important drivers of the future trajectory of GDP growth.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> As governments worldwide face the choice of whether to extend, recalibrate or discontinue some of the stimulus measures activated at the peak of the pandemic, major central banks will continue to do their part by \u201ccontrolling\u201d yield curves and, thus, preserving favorable financing conditions for the public and private sectors. Ms. Lagarde\u2019s call to governments and ECB Chief Economist Philip Lane\u2019s latest explicit remarks (\u201cthe less costly and more prudent approach is to add sufficient extra monetary policy accommodation to boost inflation momentum\u201d) further increase the likelihood that the ECB will announce an expansion and extension of its pandemic emergency purchase program (PEPP) before the end of the year.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23455,"publicationDate":"04 Oct 10:41","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178050.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJEPML-DprDjV-ne8j3PKJmc=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178050.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJEPML-DprDjV-ne8j3PKJmc=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178050.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJEPML-DprDjV-ne8j3PKJmc=&T=1&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Of course I will start with President Trump having contracted COVID-19, a topic that has been dominating the headlines. I briefly summarize where we stand and give my two cents\u2019 worth on what it could mean. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Afterwards, I will discuss two European topics. First, I will focus on our latest macro forecasts, which were published last week in our Economics Chartbook and the CEE Quarterly. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Second, I will elaborate in greater detail on my home country, Germany. In a few weeks, there will be important changes in German politics, which will also have implications for Europe. The CDU party convention at the beginning of December may not only vote for its next party leader but possibly also for the successor of Mrs. Merkel as chancellor. I will present the three CDU candidates and their political agenda.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23452,"publicationDate":"02 Oct 13:00","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178047.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJEPML-DprDjVIYAYuLouC5o=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - GDP data affected by measurement issues in public services during lockdown","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Our Chart of the Week shows that public services, such as health and education, which are counted as government consumption expenditure in GDP statistics, had a heterogeneous effect on economic growth in Europe in the second quarter. They hit UK and France\u00b4s GDP growth particularly hard, weighed moderately on growth in the Netherlands and Portugal, while their contribution was broadly neutral in Italy and Spain and moderately positive in Germany, Austria and Greece. In our view, the stringency of the lockdown hardly explains these differences. For example, the contribution of public services to French and Spanish GDP was quite different although the restrictions on economic and social activity were broadly equally severe in the two countries and were also relaxed almost at the same time. Mixed capability of public administrations to work remotely is unlikely to have been a key factor either.<\/li><li> Issues related to how the 'output' of public services is measured should explain why the contribution of these services was so different across countries. This output is usually estimated by considering the cost of the inputs that are included in the production process, namely wages. This method offsets the lack of market prices for this type of services. However, in its guidelines, Eurostat acknowledged the risk that the provision of public services could be overestimated as wages would not be significantly affected by the pandemic while output likely would be. In order to comply with Eurostat\u00b4s guidelines, INSEE, the French national statistical office, explicitly assumed that 25% of non-hospital public workers did not work at all during the lockdown and reduced government consumption accordingly in its GDP statistics. In contrast, countries that showed relatively stable contributions of government consumption to 2Q GDP apparently assumed that the production of public services was little affected by the coronavirus outbreak.<\/li><li> The most straightforward implication of these measurement issues is that they make it harder to compare 2Q GDP figures across countries, although this does not change the big picture much. Furthermore, countries that were hit hard by the contraction in government consumption expenditure in 2Q, such as the UK and France, should record a sizeable technical rebound in that component in 3Q, as life has been getting back to 'normal'. <\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23417,"publicationDate":"29 Sep 14:47","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2020_178012.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRoiETVGOc4CclMYgA95iO7Gg==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - CEE: The long and winding recovery (4Q20)","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The economic rebound in CEE was swift in May-July, powered by a rebound in consumer spending and a prompt unwinding of restrictions.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> However, the rapid removal of restrictions and poor compliance with regulation led to a faster flare-up in COVID-19 cases than in the eurozone, especially in the Balkans.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We see three sources of differentiation in the upcoming recovery: 1. the spread of the pandemic; 2. the measures taken to contain it and 3. the efficiency, scope and time horizon of support measures taken by governments and central banks. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect EU-CEE economies to contract by 5.5% in 2020, with the economies of Russia, Serbia and Turkey shrinking by 2.5-4%.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The recovery in 2021 could be incomplete in all countries but Serbia and Turkey, slowed by fiscal and credit impulses, as well as economic and (geo)political risks<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The CBR could cut the repo rate to 4% if inflationary and geopolitical risks abate. The NBR could cut the policy rate to 1% if fiscal profligacy is avoided.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The CBRT could increase rates by 2pp before year-end, before reversing this year\u2019s hikes in 2H21. The CNB might be the first EU-CEE central bank to increase rates next year.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We see little scope for FX and bond rallies in CEE in 4Q20. ROMGBs and ROMANIs are the exception if fiscal spending is reined in. The outlook is better for bonds in 2021. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Risk assessment: <\/strong> There are limited threats to the economic policy mix from political instability in Bulgaria. If pensions increase by 40%, Romania could lose its investment grade and face political instability after the elections. There is a risk of limited sanctions against Russia due to Belarus and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. There is a low risk that Hungary and Poland may veto the Next Generation EU (NGEU) framework. Geopolitical and sanction risks against Turkey remain due to tensions in the Mediterranean.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23416,"publicationDate":"29 Sep 14:03","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_178010.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJEPML-DprDjVn4QZx2WbT5A=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Economics Chartbook - Pace of growth levels off as technical rebound fades (4Q20)","product":"The Unicredit Economics Chartbook","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Global: <\/strong> The global economy will probably contract by about 3-4% in 2020, followed by growth of 5-6% in 2021. The rebound in activity in 3Q20 has been largely technical and driven by three major factors: the reopening of economies worldwide; the unfolding of pent-up demand that built up during the shutdowns; and the unprecedented assistance provided by many governments to support company activity and private household income. Strong momentum will not be sustained at the turn of 2020\/21. The outlook remains subject to substantial uncertainty, with COVID-19 likely remaining the key driver of global GDP growth until a vaccine and\/or an effective drug treatment is widely available. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> US: <\/strong> We forecast GDP shrinking 3.6% this year and rising 2.9% in 2021. Following a solid rebound in 3Q20, growth will likely level off as virus concerns and the expiry of key income-support mechanisms take their toll. More fiscal stimulus is needed to keep the recovery on track. After switching to flexible average-inflation targeting, the Fed will probably keep rates unchanged for several years to come. Ahead of the 3 November vote, Joe Biden leads in opinion polls. A Biden victory would likely see higher taxes and government spending, and a return to a more \u201cnormal\u201d foreign policy, while a Trump victory would likely bring more of the same. Controlling Congress will be key for effective program implementation. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Eurozone: <\/strong> GDP is likely to contract by 8% this year, followed by an increase of 5% in 2021. Strong growth in 3Q20 is likely to be followed by materially slower expansion at the turn of the year as support from pent-up demand wanes and the pandemic resumes its spread. A dovish Fed and the high likelihood of further EUR appreciation will put additional pressure on the ECB to do more to preserve favorable financial conditions while fiscal policy remains loose. We forecast an expansion and extension of the PEPP in December, probably by EUR 500bn through the end of 2021.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> CEE: <\/strong> We expect EU-CEE economies to contract by 5.5% in 2020, with Russia, Serbia and Turkey shrinking by 2.5-4%. The recovery in 2021 could be incomplete, slowed by negative fiscal impulses, as well as economic and (geo)political risks. After a fast rebound in May-July, the recovery is slowing throughout CEE, despite direct and indirect support measures implemented by governments and ranging from 1.7% of GDP in Bulgaria to 10% of GDP in Turkey. Most central banks will remain inactive, with limited scope for rate cuts in Russia and Romania, and additional hikes likely in Turkey. We see risks of limited sanctions against Russia due to Belarus and the Navalny poisoning, and against Turkey from tensions in the Mediterranean. We also see low risk of Hungary and Poland vetoing the Next Generation EU (NGEU) framework and of Romania\u2019s public finance becoming unsustainable.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> UK: <\/strong> Economic activity will probably shrink 9.6% this year and rise by 6.3% in 2021. Virus resurgence, new restrictions and Brexit-related disruption will weigh on growth at the turn of the year, while the new wage-subsidy scheme is unlikely to prevent large job losses when the current, more generous Job Retention Scheme expires at the end of October. A basic UK-EU trade deal remains our baseline scenario, but the Internal Market Bill increases the risk of an accident. We expect the BoE to increase its target stock of asset purchases by GBP 100bn in November. Negatives rates are now part of the BoE\u2019s toolkit, but we do not expect it to use them anytime soon.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> China: <\/strong> GDP will likely expand by 2% in 2020 and by 9% in 2021. The economy rebounded sharply in 2Q20, moving roughly back to pre-crisis levels. At the moment, the health situation looks under control. However, the recovery continues to be uneven; the supply side is leading the way, while domestic demand is lagging behind. Chinese consumers continue to be reluctant to return to their old lifestyle, with retail sales still well below the pre-COVID-19 outbreak. On the monetary front, the PBoC is likely to keep the one-year-loan prime rate steady.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23391,"publicationDate":"27 Sep 13:17","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177979.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJA_XlpdXQ-GQ4YtblYqXiTU=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177979.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJA_XlpdXQ-GQ4YtblYqXiTU=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177979.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJA_XlpdXQ-GQ4YtblYqXiTU=&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> I\u2019ll first summarize how Europe fell so drastically behind the US (and now China) in the development of digital technologies, which \u2013 of course - sets the stage for how to fix it.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> I suggest a four-pronged approach to catching up: <\/strong> 1. create a level playing field for the technology sector, including between foreign companies operating in Europe and European ones; 2. Develop a clear-eyed industrial policy with public financing (we are almost there), 3. Make the necessary adjustments to financial markets to encourage private financing of the sector, and 4. strengthen Europe\u2019s educational programs to generate and attract the necessary talent.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> On climate change, where Europe is already a leader, it will be primarily a matter of relative priorities that will create winners and losers. Long-term objectives have been articulated, but the means by which to get there also need to be articulated as long-term policy commitments, so that the private sector, companies, households and capital markets alike can adjust.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23367,"publicationDate":"23 Sep 8:30","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177955.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJA_XlpdXQ-GQlJD2q9jM9Do=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - One should not get too excited about the recent rebound in industrial activity","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Industrial production in industrialized countries (mostly OECD countries) has rebounded significantly since May. This could supposedly indicate a V-shaped recovery pattern. However, believing that the strength of the recovery will simply continue may turn out to be wrong.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Five months after the coronavirus crisis began, industrial activity in the developed world has recovered up to 60% of its drop and remains a little more than 8% below its pre-crisis level. For comparison, five months after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, industrial production had not even reached its trough and did not show any sign of recovery.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> To be clear, the Lehman bankruptcy and the COVID-19 crisis triggered two completely different shocks, with the latter largely self-imposed through lockdowns to combat the negative effects of the pandemic. With economic activity having been intentionally put on hold by governments around the world, it is not surprising that the withdrawal of restrictive measures has led to a sharp rebound in economic activity.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> However, after the easy part of the recovery was accomplished through the reopening of economies and the rapid release of pent-up demand, questions remain if governments will be able to \u201cturn on\u201d the economy going forward. In particular, fading pent-up demand as well as growing concerns about persistently high rates of new COVID-19 infections in major industrialized countries and the associated risk of renewed lockdowns may weigh on the recovery.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Against this background, we became more cautious in our forecasts a few weeks ago with regard to the pace of the recovery at the turn of the year. While growth will probably experience a strong rebound in 3Q20, the pace of such growth is likely to slow materially in 4Q20. This is also signaled by a flattening of high-frequency indicators recently.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23331,"publicationDate":"20 Sep 12:47","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177918.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJA_XlpdXQ-GQvl4qOxF6Jwo=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177918.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJA_XlpdXQ-GQvl4qOxF6Jwo=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177918.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJA_XlpdXQ-GQvl4qOxF6Jwo=&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> First, I\u2019ll discuss why inflation has dropped so low these past ten years; why that\u2019s damaging to growth; and why the ECB (and other central banks) responded appropriately.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Second, I\u2019ll outline why there is a major probability that inflation will come back over the medium to longer term, driven mostly by structural factors \u2013 but also by fiscal policies, hopefully still to be supported by monetary policy.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23305,"publicationDate":"16 Sep 13:43","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177890.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJBWb-vzSjql675RmFkkteSE=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177901.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJA_XlpdXQ-GQ1Knt-djk084=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177892.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJBWb-vzSjql6zal3_nUFUBo=&T=1"},"title":"Oil Update - Demand weakness poses a new dilemma for OPEC+","product":"Oil Update","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The global oil demand outlook has weakened as a result of the uncertain path of the coronavirus. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> July\u2019s decision by OPEC+ to increase production is proving premature \u2013 especially considering the high levels of OECD inventories.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Given the delicate political equilibrium that characterizes OPEC+ these days, the cartel is unlikely to deepen curbs unless a second global wave of contagion materializes. The risk of procrastination in the name of the apparent unity of the cartel is to fall behind the market instead of leading it.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":23303,"publicationDate":"16 Sep 12:31","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2020_177886.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJBWb-vzSjql6q8Is9HWXP84=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - China overtaking the US as most important German export market","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> German companies have recently been experiencing seismic shifts in terms of export destination by country. With an export share of 9%, China has become the single most important export market in the second quarter of 2020 before the US with 8%. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The major driver behind the latest changes has been, of course, the COVID-19 shock. Given the earlier rebound in the Chinese economy, German companies already increased their exports to China in 2Q20. Going forward, China is likely to remain the number one for some time, given the headwinds in the US caused by the coronavirus.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The exact antipode was the UK recently. With an export share of only about 4\u00bd, the UK became only the ninth most important export market after being ranked fifth in 2019 with about 6%. It was even the lowest export share since the mid-1970s. <\/li><\/ul>"}]

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5a46a2c43e8e161ff27c8db9247c563174973a5631ee155242991b73f3c4a1ec;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":20947,"publicationDate":"21 Nov 15:58","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2019_175301.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJHMnXtAfRLRLb27Bgb0Reb0=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2019_175466.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJBCfutLg1NcopqcBL9sGGRk=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"UniCredit Macro & Markets - 2020-21 Outlook: Late-cycle blues","product":"Macro & Markets","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Macro: <\/strong> Global growth is set to weaken further to 2.7% in 2020, as the US economy is likely to enter a downturn, protectionist tensions are unlikely to fade materially and the resilience of the domestic drivers of eurozone growth starts to wane. The Fed will probably cut rates by 100bp, while the ECB is expected to stand pat and focus on its policy review. Economic growth in the CEE region will likely slow as a result of external headwinds.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> FI: <\/strong> Government bonds should remain supported throughout 2020. We expect 10Y US yields to fall to 1.50%, with the curve bull-steepening. Room for lower Bund yields is more limited as the bar for further ECB rate cuts is high and the Bund curve is quite flat. The 10Y yield will likely hit -0.50% at end-2020.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> FX: <\/strong> Narrower growth and rate differentials between the US and the eurozone offer EUR-USD some upside potential. We expect the GBP to recover but this will likely be slowed by BoE easing and the risk of a Brexit-related \u201ccliff edge\u201d in December 2020.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Equities: <\/strong> We anticipate strong corrections of up to 20% in global equities in 1H20, with some relief by year-end. 2020 will be dominated by low earnings growth in Europe and slowing earnings growth in the US. We think present consensus estimates are too high.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Credit: <\/strong> The late-stage credit cycle warrants defensive positioning in European IG and HY credit, with a preference for non-cyclical sectors. Technical factors such as the CSPP should support credit, though this will likely be balanced by a deterioration in credit fundamentals and the gap to valuations will widen further.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> CEEMEA: <\/strong> EM hard-currency credit is set to post a good, mostly carry-related performance in 2020 of more than 5%. Our preference remains BBB and BB rated credit.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","hash":"5a46a2c43e8e161ff27c8db9247c563174973a5631ee155242991b73f3c4a1ec","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"400","synopsisexpand":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

a4cdae097062004f4cf519496761beb23ec0de3a6728b0ab26a7d15635102a0a;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":23280,"publicationDate":"14 Sep 10:29","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_177861.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2nyfW5CoPOGyGcSR2zWP6xCA==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Rates Perspectives - Heavier supply at the long end to meet with Fed QE","product":"Rates Perspectives","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> US marketable debt is likely to rise significantly in the coming quarters, with the Treasury probably aiming to lengthen debt maturity. Looking at the past, we analyze which impact a change in funding mix might have on the slope of the UST curve.<\/li><li> As foreign investors\u00b4 demand for USTs is likely to remain lukewarm in the near future, action by the Fed will be key to keeping yields subdued.<\/li><\/ul>","hash":"a4cdae097062004f4cf519496761beb23ec0de3a6728b0ab26a7d15635102a0a","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"400","synopsisexpand":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"4"}},{"layout":"linklist","uid":22843,"publicationDate":"09 Jul 8:35","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_177386.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2nO6XLPK2SkhnVq7fg7fdZMA==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Rates Perspectives - Weakening fundamentals unlikely to weigh on OATs","product":"Rates Perspectives","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> OATs widened relative to Bunds at the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, in line with other EGB spreads, but have since re-traced, with the 10Y OAT\/Bund spread returning to around 30bp, broadly in line with the pre-COVID average. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In our view, there are several factors that make a widening of the OAT\/Bund spread unlikely in the next few months. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Macro fundamentals for France, which have deteriorated fast since the outbreak of the pandemic in line with all the other eurozone countries, have not been a major factor driving OATs spreads wider in the past, and we expect this to be the case this time too. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The risk of a rating downgrade of France is moderate and even this would not be a good enough reason for OAT spread widening in our view. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> With the Eurosystem absorbing most of net OAT issuance this year, the portion of French debt held by price-insensitive investors would remain high (around 40%) even if foreign officials were to reduce their exposure to French debt (not our baseline scenario). <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> All in all, the high liquidity and relative safety of OATs and the yield pickup to Bunds they offer will continue to make OATs a good investment, especially given the lack of valid alternatives. We therefore consider any temporary widening of the OAT-Bund spread a buying opportunity.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":22393,"publicationDate":"19 May 7:32","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_176890.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2nW1DHnTvta0o0CL0_mPxnUg==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Rates Perspectives - T-LTRO III: Take-up expectation and market impact","product":"Rates Perspectives","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> At its last meeting, the ECB announced a sizable reduction in T-LTRO III cost. Banks will pay 0.5% below the depo rate if they meet certain lending conditions and 0.5% below the MRO rate otherwise. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> The attractive pricing should lead to a large take-up: <\/strong> EUR\u00a0900-1,400bn gross and EUR 550-1,000bn net, adding the four operations. Net demand includes EUR\u00a0325bn already drawn from the bridge LTRO.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> As the more favorable pricing applies to the period June 2020 \u2013 June 2021, we expect strong front loading at the June operation (settlement 24 June 2020, maturity June 2023, results to be announced on 18 June). <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect that use of T-LTRO III liquidity will be more pronounced in the periphery than in core countries.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The need to temporary park liquidity may benefit the short end of sovereign curves, in particular in the periphery, where credit premiums and liquidity parking needs are expected to be stronger. Past experience, however, suggests not to expect big moves in credit spreads.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":22151,"publicationDate":"23 Apr 8:19","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_176630.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2nlVdqzbTp94Q4BdEhR8EC5A==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Rates Perspectives - Eurozone funding needs in 2020 after COVID-19","product":"Rates Perspectives","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The COVID emergency will lead to a massive increase in public debt and deficit in 2020. We now expect net issuance of marketable debt instruments issued by eurozone governments (bonds and bills) in 2020 to amount to around EUR 1tn, up from EUR 185bn before the COVID-19 emergency. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Net marketable debt issuance could be up to EUR 310bn lower, in case eurozone countries use financing measures approved so far by the Eurogroup, and could be substantially lower depending on the size and functioning of the recovery fund which will be discussed today at the European Council meeting. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> T-bills are coming back in fashion as funding instruments. At the eurozone level, we expect 40% of net issuance to come in the form of T-bills and to see a sharp increase in net T-bill issuance, especially from core countries. The abundance of excess liquidity in the system and the ECB\u2019s pandemic emergency purchasing program (PEPP), which can also buy T-bills, should prevent pressure from building up at the short end of the curve. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Our estimates are accompanied by very high degrees of uncertainty, as we await more details on measures approved by the Eurogroup on 9 April and for developments at the European Council meeting today.<\/li><\/ul>"}]

eada0c4ea76c629eb47a2c699db2ed6e715070a11680a5d9921f837e1ffd3a5f;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":21554,"publicationDate":"14 Feb 15:36","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_175974.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2nw6n3SIBxpGTmDpAUviCpvg==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_176061.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2nNTt7vdgznH-Jqun0zij8HQ==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Shortened version of the Euro Credit Pilot (February 2020)","product":"Euro Credit Pilot - Strategy","synopsis":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>This is a shortened version of the Euro Credit Pilot, which we deem to be an acceptable minor non-monetary benefit under MiFID II.<\/p><\/p><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Introduction: <\/strong> The outbreak of the coronavirus has already led to the disruption of global supply chains, with numerous producers across sectors reporting production halts at facilities in China. The related uncertainties warrant defensive positioning in European credit.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Macro Outlook: <\/strong> So far there is little data on the initial impact on the global economy, and comparisons with the SARS outbreak in 2002 are not straightforward. But 1Q growth-related data will be negative.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Micro Fundamentals: <\/strong> Sluggish earnings growth in Europe will negatively impact companies\u2019 credit fundamentals.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Credit Quality Trend: <\/strong> The global economic outlook has become clouded, and the risk of economic slowdown in China due to the coronavirus has increased. Thus, the overall credit quality of European companies will likely decrease as indicated by the potential number of fallen angels.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Market Technicals: <\/strong> With the intensification of CSPP purchases, particularly in the primary market, the ECB is providing continuous support.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Valuation &amp; Timing: <\/strong> We are keeping our end-2020 spread projections unchanged.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Sector Allocation &amp; Recommendation Overview: <\/strong> Uncertainties related to the coronavirus and its ramifications for Chinese growth and the global supply chain warrant defensive positioning. In this context, we lower our recommendation on Automobiles &amp; Parts to underweight from marketweight. We also lower our recommendation on Basic Resources to marketweight from overweight.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","hash":"eada0c4ea76c629eb47a2c699db2ed6e715070a11680a5d9921f837e1ffd3a5f","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"-1","showcompanies":"-1","synopsislength":"-1","showcountries":"-1","showcurrencies":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"2"}},{"layout":"linklist","uid":21100,"publicationDate":"10 Dec 14:54","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2019_175468.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVEGHysWJl2NsdbHS0TJ1vmUJDnt4SYQWKQ==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2019_175539.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVEGHysWJl2NsY9mVAida0HvS49pKYFDFew==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Shortened version of the Euro Credit Pilot (December 2019)","product":"Euro Credit Pilot - Strategy","synopsis":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>This is a shortened version of the Euro Credit Pilot, which we deem to be an acceptable minor non-monetary benefit under MiFID II.<\/p><\/p><p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>The late stage of the credit cycle will likely be prolonged by the extraordinary ECB policy measures. Performance in European credit is being pulled in one direction by cyclical headwinds (projected in our below-consensus growth forecast and a mild recession in the US), low earnings growth and upside risks in new-bond supply. It is pulled in another direction by monetary-policy easing, which fuels the hunt for yield. As a result of these forces being exerted on European credit, we expect spreads in the iBoxx Senior NFI and the iBoxx Financials Senior to be flat, on balance, reaching 60bp by the end of 2020, i.e. close to current levels. Thus, carry is expected to be the main source of return in European credit in 2020. Spreads in the iBoxx HY are expected to widen to 450bp during the same period.<\/p><\/p>"}]

cee45ec3c62a2f7c371ab5aeacebf397b3dfcda3558749efec14891ce5a1d50e;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":23417,"publicationDate":"29 Sep 14:47","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2020_178012.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRoiETVGOc4CclMYgA95iO7Gg==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - CEE: The long and winding recovery (4Q20)","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The economic rebound in CEE was swift in May-July, powered by a rebound in consumer spending and a prompt unwinding of restrictions.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> However, the rapid removal of restrictions and poor compliance with regulation led to a faster flare-up in COVID-19 cases than in the eurozone, especially in the Balkans.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We see three sources of differentiation in the upcoming recovery: 1. the spread of the pandemic; 2. the measures taken to contain it and 3. the efficiency, scope and time horizon of support measures taken by governments and central banks. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect EU-CEE economies to contract by 5.5% in 2020, with the economies of Russia, Serbia and Turkey shrinking by 2.5-4%.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The recovery in 2021 could be incomplete in all countries but Serbia and Turkey, slowed by fiscal and credit impulses, as well as economic and (geo)political risks<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The CBR could cut the repo rate to 4% if inflationary and geopolitical risks abate. The NBR could cut the policy rate to 1% if fiscal profligacy is avoided.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The CBRT could increase rates by 2pp before year-end, before reversing this year\u2019s hikes in 2H21. The CNB might be the first EU-CEE central bank to increase rates next year.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We see little scope for FX and bond rallies in CEE in 4Q20. ROMGBs and ROMANIs are the exception if fiscal spending is reined in. The outlook is better for bonds in 2021. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Risk assessment: <\/strong> There are limited threats to the economic policy mix from political instability in Bulgaria. If pensions increase by 40%, Romania could lose its investment grade and face political instability after the elections. There is a risk of limited sanctions against Russia due to Belarus and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. There is a low risk that Hungary and Poland may veto the Next Generation EU (NGEU) framework. Geopolitical and sanction risks against Turkey remain due to tensions in the Mediterranean.<\/li><\/ul>","hash":"cee45ec3c62a2f7c371ab5aeacebf397b3dfcda3558749efec14891ce5a1d50e","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"400","synopsisexpand":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

bd87e708c56b3b8a9552819c45c998d45a56266083972c3b154575aaa4cc495c;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":17097,"publicationDate":"23 Apr 8:01","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"\/fileadmin\/Presentations_ex_Marketingpraesi\/Praesentation_Call_ReesForUBK_20Apr20.pdf","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Presentation - Coronavirus und seine volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen","product":"Presentation","synopsis":"","hash":"bd87e708c56b3b8a9552819c45c998d45a56266083972c3b154575aaa4cc495c","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"-1","showcompanies":"-1","synopsislength":"-1","showcountries":"-1","showcurrencies":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

fca5774f669803887558f1f8bf49f8ba6cbad35f9de48a9f1720f5619f212128;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":23417,"publicationDate":"29 Sep 14:47","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2020_178012.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRoiETVGOc4CclMYgA95iO7Gg==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - CEE: The long and winding recovery (4Q20)","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The economic rebound in CEE was swift in May-July, powered by a rebound in consumer spending and a prompt unwinding of restrictions.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> However, the rapid removal of restrictions and poor compliance with regulation led to a faster flare-up in COVID-19 cases than in the eurozone, especially in the Balkans.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We see three sources of differentiation in the upcoming recovery: 1. the spread of the pandemic; 2. the measures taken to contain it and 3. the efficiency, scope and time horizon of support measures taken by governments and central banks. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect EU-CEE economies to contract by 5.5% in 2020, with the economies of Russia, Serbia and Turkey shrinking by 2.5-4%.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The recovery in 2021 could be incomplete in all countries but Serbia and Turkey, slowed by fiscal and credit impulses, as well as economic and (geo)political risks<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The CBR could cut the repo rate to 4% if inflationary and geopolitical risks abate. The NBR could cut the policy rate to 1% if fiscal profligacy is avoided.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The CBRT could increase rates by 2pp before year-end, before reversing this year\u2019s hikes in 2H21. The CNB might be the first EU-CEE central bank to increase rates next year.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We see little scope for FX and bond rallies in CEE in 4Q20. ROMGBs and ROMANIs are the exception if fiscal spending is reined in. The outlook is better for bonds in 2021. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Risk assessment: <\/strong> There are limited threats to the economic policy mix from political instability in Bulgaria. If pensions increase by 40%, Romania could lose its investment grade and face political instability after the elections. There is a risk of limited sanctions against Russia due to Belarus and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. There is a low risk that Hungary and Poland may veto the Next Generation EU (NGEU) framework. Geopolitical and sanction risks against Turkey remain due to tensions in the Mediterranean.<\/li><\/ul>","hash":"fca5774f669803887558f1f8bf49f8ba6cbad35f9de48a9f1720f5619f212128","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"-1","showcompanies":"-1","synopsislength":"-1","showcountries":"-1","showcurrencies":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

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