e2fda6f48f4beb7f2e9a16bde35b727c4d7cd8e0d73c422d49e7378ade652268;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":24671,"publicationDate":"25 Feb 13:56","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179366.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJOzmBJ0beaycvHZxZOjcnbk=&&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - Learning to live with the virus","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Our Chart of the Week suggests that firms and households globally have been increasingly adapting to the pandemic environment, managing to contain the economic damage that stems from reduced mobility. The reduction in mobility reflects both restriction<\/li><\/ul>","hash":"e2fda6f48f4beb7f2e9a16bde35b727c4d7cd8e0d73c422d49e7378ade652268","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","synopsislength":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","nolinktitle":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"12"}},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24620,"publicationDate":"21 Feb 11:22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179310.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJOzmBJ0beaycsDu5f3o0PVo=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179310.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJOzmBJ0beaycsDu5f3o0PVo=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179310.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJOzmBJ0beaycsDu5f3o0PVo=&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Why Draghi\u2019s government makes me optimistic for Italy.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> The steepening US yield curve: <\/strong> The drivers, the risk of spill-over to Europe, and likely central bank responses.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24617,"publicationDate":"19 Feb 13:35","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179306.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJOzmBJ0beayc7bWud3Jg9y0=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - Bottlenecks in supply chains plaguing companies and spurring price pressure","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> While business sentiment among European manufacturers brightened in February, companies have been getting increasingly plagued by bottlenecks in their supply chains again. This can be seen by looking at today\u2019s releases of the suppliers\u2019 delivery times index included in the manufacturing PMI survey. In Germany, this gauge has even surpassed the levels from spring 2020 when the first lockdown set in. In the UK and France, it is still not record-high by historical standards but surged to unusually elevated levels again. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The reasons for the latest squeezes are different from the ones last year. At that time, the lockdown also affected the manufacturing sector which brought down activities across many industries and countries. In contrast, during the second lockdown, manufacturing has been kept largely open. In our view, there are global and country-specific reasons for the latest severe bottlenecks in supply chains. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> One major global trigger is the massive shortage in the semiconductor industry which has been increasingly spilling over into other sectors. Chips are highly important components, being used as input and intermediary goods in various sectors worldwide, such as auto, telecommunication, computers and consumer electronics. Another reason is the shortage in freight capacities for goods coming from China. As pointed out in one of our last editions of the Chart of the Week - Freight costs of European companies soaring, about three weeks ago, freight costs for European companies have been surging. Since then, the costs of shipping goods from China to Europe kept rising. Finally, there are country-specific factors. Examples are the new controls imposed for trucks at the German-Czech (and German-Austrian) border which may hamper the flows of input goods, especially for auto parts. For the UK, Brexit is certainly a major driver of the story. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> One important implication of the bottlenecks in supply chains is straightforward. Price pressure for industrial goods has been rising further, as already indicated by increasing input prices for European manufacturers. While some of this might be passed on to consumers, we think that a broad-based and persistent rise in consumer price inflation is unlikely for two reasons. First, supply disruptions (\u201ccost push\u201d) are largely a result of the pandemic and are likely to be only a temporary phenomenon. Second, output gaps will remain negative for the time being, especially in the services sector, and therefore limit the scope of demand-pull inflation. <\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24602,"publicationDate":"18 Feb 9:34","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179291.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJCC3OXQzGgAGDtt1KMLz0YY=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - 3% inflation in Germany? Maybe\u2026but only temporarily","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In a recent interview with a German newspaper, Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann said that inflation in Germany would rise above 3% by the end of this year. His statement triggered a lively public discussion about persistently higher German inflation in the years to come. While he also added that the increase will be temporary due to several one-off factors, this has received less attention in the public debate. Moreover, in terms of what conclusions can be drawn from higher German inflation, it remains clear that, what matters from the ECB's perspective is eurozone inflation, not German inflation per se.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In our Chart of the Week we show that German inflation is indeed set to accelerate, as indicated by rising selling-price expectations. Besides one-off factors (such as the reversal of the VAT reduction in 2H20), this is driven by fundamental cyclical pressure as represented by a higher orders-to-inventory ratio, which will result in higher goods inflation. But the chart also shows that cyclical factors have begun to signal a weakening in momentum recently, which is why stronger price increases are unlikely to be sustained.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In the chart we have lagged the German orders-to-inventory ratio in the manufacturing sector by ten months as it shows the highest correlation with German manufacturers\u2019 selling-price expectations at this time lag. In particular, before and during the 2008-9 financial crisis, the ratio ran well ahead of future selling-price expectations. In the post-financial crisis period, however, the ratio lost some of its predictive power before becoming highly correlated again more recently. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The correlation of selling-price expectations with actual German goods inflation is relatively high, at about 75%. The correlation with the actual German headline all-item rate is weaker due to services inflation. But since goods prices account for about 50% of the German consumer price basket, inflationary pressure from goods makes a significant contribution to the headline reading.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Going forward, we expect headline inflation to increase to above 2% on average in the second half of the year rather than to above 3%, but the exact number is ultimately less important. More importantly, we consider underlying inflation to be mainly driven by cyclical factors. With these having slowed over the last few months, we think that price increases will be limited. And with Germany likely entering a lower growth path at the end of this year, inflation will start to ease again in 2022.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24563,"publicationDate":"14 Feb 11:56","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179243.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJCC3OXQzGgAGI9x_1GJjKbI=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179243.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJCC3OXQzGgAGI9x_1GJjKbI=&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179243.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJCC3OXQzGgAGI9x_1GJjKbI=&T=1&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The risk of fiscal overkill in the US leading to inflation \u2013 and the (virtual) zero-risk of Europe doing enough.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Why Italy\u2019s abnormally low participation rate has been possibly the single biggest impediment to growth in the past \u2013 and why boosting it will generate stronger growth. And now is the time to do it.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24529,"publicationDate":"10 Feb 11:15","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179203.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJCC3OXQzGgAGssjxCuE8B4U=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - The mind-boggling difference in approach to the crisis","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In our Chart of the Week we illustrate the vast difference between the planned 2021 fiscal response to the crisis in the US and the eurozone. In times of crisis, the private sector cuts their demand for consumption and investment, leaving an \u201coutput gap\u201d between aggregate demand and supply. In the present crisis, this has been witnessed to an extreme degree because of the mandated and voluntary social distancing, which impacts demand, particularly for services. Economics 101 tells you that it makes sense for the fiscal authorities to boost expenditures and defer or cut taxes with a view to filling-in this gap, both to protect the most vulnerable in society and to reduce the economic scarring effects (i.e. the destruction of productive capacity).<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> As illustrated, we estimate the 2021 output gap in the US to be around USD 900bn, while the eurozone gap is some EUR 1tn. These numbers reflect both the fact that the eurozone entered the crisis a year ago with an existing output gap, and the US did not, and the fact the eurozone economy took a bigger hit to demand in 2020 than the US. These are the holes policymakers should aim to fill. Given the severity of the crisis and the high uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook, including with respect to fiscal multipliers, we believe that doing too much would be better than doing too little.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The US administration has taken this view to heart, aiming for an eye-watering stimulus of USD 2.8tn, made up of USD 0.9tn signed into law at end-December and Biden\u2019s plan for another USD 1.9tn. We think the latter component will be scaled back to around USD 1.2tn, but that still leaves a fiscal injection of USD 2.1tn. To this you may add about USD 200bn in automatic stabilizers, giving a total boost to demand of 2.5 times the output gap, assuming a multiplier of about one.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In sharp contrast, the eurozone is planning just about EUR 420bn in national and EU fiscal injections this year. If you add the automatic stabilizers, which are larger in the eurozone than in the US for any given output gap, of about EUR 300bn then you\u2019ll get just over 70% of the output gap covered. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Bottom line: <\/strong> The US will get a massive boost to growth and employment this year, which will push inflation somewhat higher, but \u2013 in our assessment \u2013 not dramatically so because of the fairly flat Phillips Curve. The eurozone will not close the output gap, which will leave 2021 GDP short of the pre-pandemic level - with no risk of pushing inflation sustainably back to the ECB target.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24491,"publicationDate":"07 Feb 10:35","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179161.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJMytj_yIB6BfhTpmw5BhtGo=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179161.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJMytj_yIB6BfhTpmw5BhtGo=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179161.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJMytj_yIB6BfhTpmw5BhtGo=&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> What to look out for as Draghi navigates the road to the Chigi Palace and forms a government, and the policy agenda he\u2019ll need to pursue as prime minister. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The new US debate of what\u2019s the right amount of fiscal stimulus \u2013 and what we Europeans should learn from it.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24449,"publicationDate":"02 Feb 10:58","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179118.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJMytj_yIB6BfzWox34cw4Po=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - Global light-vehicle sales on the mend","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":""},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24423,"publicationDate":"31 Jan 12:18","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179092.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPKfsweEeqIJvpO_1EQvcZo=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179092.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPKfsweEeqIJvpO_1EQvcZo=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179092.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPKfsweEeqIJvpO_1EQvcZo=&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> I\u2019ll put this past week\u2019s data news in context.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> I\u2019ll summarize the key messages from the IMF\u2019s updated flagship publications.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Recognizing the huge uncertainties, I\u2019ll illustrate why \u201cdoing too much\u201d fiscal stimulus now is nothing to worry about compared with the alternative of \u201cdoing too little\u201d.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> And I\u2019ll argue that this past week\u2019s debt brake discussion in Germany, which on the surface looks like having been won by the fiscal hawks, ironically, leaves more fiscal flexibility in coming years than what Helge Braun\u2019s original suggestion might have implied.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24407,"publicationDate":"28 Jan 15:27","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179075.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPKfsweEeqIJzUwDNEecuOg=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179087.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPKfsweEeqIJUe1Wcoe4ZnY=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179102.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJMytj_yIB6BfbKd3iQN3osQ=&T=1"},"title":"Oil Update - An excess of market optimism?","product":"Oil Update","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The oil rally that started last November continues unabated, with investors pinning their hopes on the mass vaccination campaign and Saudi Arabia\u2019s role of swing producer. But both hopes are probably misplaced. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> With few exceptions, the vaccine rollout has been underwhelming so far. Moreover, several emerging economies are lagging behind in terms of pre-ordered vaccines. If different parts of the world achieves herd immunity at different times, this will have an impact on the recovery in global oil demand. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Saudi Arabia, which in early January decided to unilaterally cut production by 1mb\/d in February and March in order to end a diplomatic stalemate within OPEC+, is unlikely to be willing to play the role of sole market stabilizer beyond 1Q21.<\/li><\/ul><p class=\"ucrIndent\">The oil rally that started last November continues unabated. Brent prices, which are currently trading at USD 55\/bbl, are now 49% higher than in early November and 8% higher YTD. Investors are pinning their hopes on two factors. First, that the mass vaccination campaign will be rapid enough to quickly normalize demand. Second, that Saudi Arabia, which in early January decided to unilaterally cut its production by 1mb\/d in February and March in order to end a diplomatic stalemate within OPEC+, has suddenly become willing to act as the sole market stabilizer \u2013 after having refused to play that role since the beginning of the shale revolution in the US. Both hopes are probably misplaced and some (mild) downward market correction towards USD 50\/bbl in the coming weeks is likely. <\/p><p class=\"ucrIndent\">Demand weakness ignored<\/p><p class=\"ucrIndent\">Vaccine hopes and the prospect of achieving herd immunity in advanced economies by the end of the year have been the key support factors pushing up risk appetite and, therefore, oil prices. Brent has also benefited from the weakening of the USD across the board. As shown in Chart 1, since 2016, the correlation between the Brent price and the USD has been persistently negative, albeit with varying degrees of intensity. This is the result of the financialization of the oil market. When risk appetite increases because of improved market sentiment, the USD loses its appeal as a safe haven and investors boost their purchases of risky assets, including commodities. <\/p>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24377,"publicationDate":"26 Jan 9:40","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179045.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPKfsweEeqIJr8opV8qu21M=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Chart of the Week - Freight costs of European companies soaring","product":"Chart of the Week","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The costs of shipping goods from China to Europe by water have hit unprecedented highs recently. Since the start of November 2020, the Freightos Baltic Index for this route more than tripled by surging from about USD 2,100 to USD 7,800 at the end of last week. In comparison, the recent strengthening of the EUR-USD exchange rate by a couple of percent has literally been only a drop in the \u201cocean\u201d for European companies. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The Freightos Baltic indices summarize freight costs of so-called 40 containers which equal forty-foot equivalent units and are available for different routes. In contrast to goods coming from China, the costs of shipping goods from Europe to China have been steady. <\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24356,"publicationDate":"24 Jan 12:03","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179022.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPKfsweEeqIJU-JoYODzV-8=&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179022.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPKfsweEeqIJU-JoYODzV-8=&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/economics_docs_2021_179022.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=C814QI31EjqIm_1zIJDBJPKfsweEeqIJU-JoYODzV-8=&T=1"},"title":"Chief Economist\u00b4s Comment - Sunday Wrap","product":"Chief Economist's Comment","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The positive outlook for policies in the US, but also the longer-term damage to potential output that Trump\u2019s misguided policies have inflicted.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The peculiar cooling of European policy ambitions by the national fiscal authorities.<\/li><\/ul>"}]

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a4cdae097062004f4cf519496761beb23ec0de3a6728b0ab26a7d15635102a0a;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":24513,"publicationDate":"09 Feb 9:09","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2021_179186.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVCsY1pNwWYpSJTSghNhr0dG4SAep3M0SAg==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Rates Perspectives - Trading on the edge: 30\/50Y BTP flattener as a hedge against volatility","product":"Rates Perspectives","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Eurozone issuers are taking advantage of the low-yield environment and are increasing their issuance activity at the extra-long end. France and Belgium have recently issued new 50Y bonds, while Spain is expected to sell a new 50Y SPGB today. Italy could join them in the coming months.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We look at the main factors driving the 30\/50Y spread on both the BTP and the OAT curve. In addition to differences in term premium and liquidity conditions, the 30\/50Y spread on both curves is affected by yield volatility and differences in bond convexity.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We like a 30\/50Y flattener on the BTP curve, especially after recent steepening, as it represents a defensive trade if selling pressure on BTPs resurface. A new 50Y BTP would represent a good entry point for this trade.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We show that a 30\/50Y BTP flattener would work as a better defensive trade than a 10\/30Y BTP flattener.<\/li><\/ul>","hash":"a4cdae097062004f4cf519496761beb23ec0de3a6728b0ab26a7d15635102a0a","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"0","showcompanies":"0","showcountries":"0","showcurrencies":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","synopsislength":"400","synopsisexpand":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"4"}},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24424,"publicationDate":"01 Feb 7:01","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2021_179093.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVCsY1pNwWYpSseITqiopMUYb21i9hmCfCA==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Rates Perspectives - EU bonds and Bunds...mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the safest of them all?","product":"Rates Perspectives","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> EU bonds will become an important new component of the European sovereign market. In principle, they will establish the much desired common euro-denominated safe asset with a \u201cpolitical joint and several\u201d structure.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In reality, however, compared with the strongest eurozone sovereigns, their pricing will reflect two aspects: liquidity and the perception of the political strength of the EU project. As the EU budget is ultimately guaranteed by the member states, EU bonds should not trade tighter than its strongest member.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The outperformance of EU bonds versus Bunds since the first SURE transaction reflects expectations that these assets will gain prominence and their liquidity will improve, making them more similar to sovereigns. We expect further tightening as a result.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> At current yield levels, we prefer EU bonds to small and medium-sized sovereigns. At the extra-long end, we regard EU bonds as expensive versus Bunds and prefer OATs, which offer a considerable yield pickup. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The strong secondary-market performance of the EU SURE transactions was spread-supportive for other European supranationals. We expect EU bonds to trade more expensive than other E-Names.<\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24229,"publicationDate":"08 Jan 10:39","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2021_178879.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVCsY1pNwWYpSxYneOq3LGyt4eyF56Lnjig==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Rates Perspectives - Italy\u2019s 2021 funding: We still favor the 5Y tenor","product":"Rates Perspectives","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Heavy government-bond issuance in Italy is set to continue in 2021. The amount of medium-term and long-term (M\/L) bond issuance (all instruments) in 2021 might be around EUR 345bn, which is roughly in line with that of 2020. Because there will be a higher amount of redemptions in 2021 compared to 2020, this will result in slightly lower net market funding compared to 2020: EUR 120bn in 2021, compared to EUR 145bn in 2020. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect Italy to continue lengthening its debt maturity in 2021. Its cost of debt will likely decline further and could fall from 2.40% to 2.10-2.15% if our rate forecasts prove correct. At the end of 2021, we estimate that the Eurosystem will hold 27-28% of Italy marketable debt. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The portion of issuance at the 3Y and the 5Y (to a lesser extent) tenors will likely decline compared to what it was in 2020, while the portion of funding allocated at the 10Y should remain very heavy. We expect supply pressure to remain sizeable at the extra-long maturities. <\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Based on the supply outlook and our rate view, our favorite trades on the BTP curve are long 5Y vs. 10Y and long 5Y vs. 2Y, or a combination of the two in a barbell, going long 5Y vs. the wings. <\/li><\/ul>"},{"layout":"linklist","uid":24066,"publicationDate":"04 Dec 14:22","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_178703.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2nFvdgpPgOyS7_7gSenXs8vw==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Rates Perspectives - 2021: Another year of heavy issuance but ECB to remain supportive","product":"Rates Perspectives","synopsis":"<ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> 2021 will be another year of very heavy funding requirements in the eurozone, with overall financing needs amounting to around EUR 1.52tn, only moderately lower than this year. M\/L redemptions will amount to EUR 665bn, down from EUR 700bn in 2020. We expect an overall cash deficit of EUR 835bn, only moderately lower than in 2020.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect the use of funds from the EU (under either the SURE or the NGEU) to mitigate only moderately intense issuance activity in the primary market by around EUR 85\/90bn.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> T-bill issuance is expected to be much less heavy than in 2020: we pencil in around EUR 80bn of net T-bill supply in 2021, down from EUR 255bn in 2020.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> This will leave M\/L domestic bond issuance to represent the lion\u2019s share of funding sources. We project M\/L-term issuance at the eurozone level to reach EUR 1.3tn in 2021, some EUR 100bn higher than this year. We expect the lengthening of debt maturity to be a theme in 2021. Net M\/L issuance will likely be particularly heavy in 1Q21, due to front-loading and low redemptions.<\/li><\/ul><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> However, heavy market funding will not be a key driver of yields, as the ECB will remain extremely active with asset purchases, as in 2020. Indeed, we expect the ECB to purchase an amount similar to the entire new net issuance in 2021.<\/li><\/ul>"}]

eada0c4ea76c629eb47a2c699db2ed6e715070a11680a5d9921f837e1ffd3a5f;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":24050,"publicationDate":"03 Dec 14:06","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_178685.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2npiIhNkXBBHa2N8hoO2XWEw==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_178812.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2n65M1ZiLkezQQ5vDJdlNayQ==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Shortened version of the Euro Credit Pilot (December 2020)","product":"Euro Credit Pilot - Strategy","synopsis":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>This is a shortened version of the Euro Credit Pilot, which we deem to be an acceptable minor non-monetary benefit under MiFID II.<\/p><\/p><p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented uncertainty in the global economic outlook, implying low visibility into the future. In our base scenario, while the macro picture might be uncertain, particularly at the beginning of 2021, we expect, however, the credit market to see another strong year, supported by an economic rebound from 2Q and technical factors.<\/p><\/p>","hash":"eada0c4ea76c629eb47a2c699db2ed6e715070a11680a5d9921f837e1ffd3a5f","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"-1","showcompanies":"-1","synopsislength":"-1","showcountries":"-1","showcurrencies":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"2"}},{"layout":"linklist","uid":21554,"publicationDate":"14 Feb 15:36","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_175974.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2nw6n3SIBxpGTmDpAUviCpvg==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/fxfistrategy_docs_2020_176061.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=KZGTuQCn4lsvclJnUgseVFcI2-vTFR2nNTt7vdgznH-Jqun0zij8HQ==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Shortened version of the Euro Credit Pilot (February 2020)","product":"Euro Credit Pilot - Strategy","synopsis":"<p class=\"ucrIndent\"><p>This is a shortened version of the Euro Credit Pilot, which we deem to be an acceptable minor non-monetary benefit under MiFID II.<\/p><\/p><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Introduction: <\/strong> The outbreak of the coronavirus has already led to the disruption of global supply chains, with numerous producers across sectors reporting production halts at facilities in China. The related uncertainties warrant defensive positioning in European credit.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Macro Outlook: <\/strong> So far there is little data on the initial impact on the global economy, and comparisons with the SARS outbreak in 2002 are not straightforward. But 1Q growth-related data will be negative.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Micro Fundamentals: <\/strong> Sluggish earnings growth in Europe will negatively impact companies\u2019 credit fundamentals.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Credit Quality Trend: <\/strong> The global economic outlook has become clouded, and the risk of economic slowdown in China due to the coronavirus has increased. Thus, the overall credit quality of European companies will likely decrease as indicated by the potential number of fallen angels.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Market Technicals: <\/strong> With the intensification of CSPP purchases, particularly in the primary market, the ECB is providing continuous support.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Valuation &amp; Timing: <\/strong> We are keeping our end-2020 spread projections unchanged.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li><strong> Sector Allocation &amp; Recommendation Overview: <\/strong> Uncertainties related to the coronavirus and its ramifications for Chinese growth and the global supply chain warrant defensive positioning. In this context, we lower our recommendation on Automobiles &amp; Parts to underweight from marketweight. We also lower our recommendation on Basic Resources to marketweight from overweight.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>"}]

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bd87e708c56b3b8a9552819c45c998d45a56266083972c3b154575aaa4cc495c;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":17097,"publicationDate":"23 Apr 8:01","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"\/fileadmin\/Presentations_ex_Marketingpraesi\/Praesentation_Call_ReesForUBK_20Apr20.pdf","protectedFileLinkDe":"","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"Presentation - Coronavirus und seine volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen","product":"Presentation","synopsis":"","hash":"bd87e708c56b3b8a9552819c45c998d45a56266083972c3b154575aaa4cc495c","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"-1","showcompanies":"-1","synopsislength":"-1","showcountries":"-1","showcurrencies":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

fca5774f669803887558f1f8bf49f8ba6cbad35f9de48a9f1720f5619f212128;;[{"layout":"linklist","uid":24272,"publicationDate":"13 Jan 15:21","emaObject":{"protectedFileLink":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2021_178928.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRozlcCgEKTWgv-25mWQRJ_Fg==&T=1","protectedFileLinkDe":"https:\/\/www.research.unicredit.eu\/DocsKey\/emergingmarkets_docs_2021_179119.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=l6KjPzSYBBGzROuioxedUNdVqq1wFeRobiXLAKQk1dwLWZbE-jDbXg==&T=1&T=1","protectedFileLinkIt":""},"title":"CEE Quarterly - A path to recovery (1Q21)","product":"CEE Quarterly","synopsis":"<p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> We expect economies in EU-CEE and in the western Balkans, to grow by around 3.3% in 2021 after slumping by close to 5% in 2020. A weak start to 2021, lower fiscal support, looser labor-market conditions, delayed investment and external risks could result in an incomplete recovery.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> GDP in EU-CEE and the western Balkans could return to pre-COVID-19 levels in 2022, when growth could accelerate to more than 4%. Interest rates could be increased in Czechia at the end of 2021 and in Poland and Romania in 2022.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> EU support in the form of the European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE), Next Generation EU (NGEU) and the 2021-27 EU budget could support the recovery in EU-CEE in 2022 and beyond.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> IN EU-CEE, only the NBR is expected to cut rates in 2021. The CNB could be the first central bank to increase rates in 2H21, followed by the NBP and the NBR in 2H22. Central banks could purchase more bonds if state funding needs rise above current plans.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In Turkey, economic growth could accelerate from around 1.2% in 2020, to 2.9% in 2021 and 4% in 2022. Without structural reforms, most of the monetary tightening implemented in 2020 could be reversed in 2021 to spur lending and growth. This strategy is not sustainable, and may only serve to put pressure back on the current account, the currency and rates.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> After declining by almost 4% in 2020, the Russian economy could grow by 2.2-2.3% in 2021 and 2022. The central bank could keep the policy rate at 4.25% in 2021-22 if inflation remains below the 4% target.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> The COVID-19 pandemic will continue to affect CEE countries in 2021, with herd immunity reached this year only if vaccination accelerates significantly. However, restrictions and their negative economic impact could be much milder next winter than they are currently.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In 2021, government anti-pandemic support will decline compared to 2020 in all CEE countries but Bulgaria. Indirect support could be less efficient than last year, unless governments focus on grants, rather than loans to SMEs. Labor-market support may be needed to avoid a large second wave of layoffs. Support could be withdrawn starting in 2H21.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Political noise will be a risk in Bulgaria and Czechia, where parliamentary elections will be held in 2021.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> Democracy in CEE would benefit if the US administration returns to multilateralism.<\/p><\/li><\/ul><p><ul class=\"ucrBullets\"><li> In the next two years, EU fund disbursements are unlikely to be tied to observing the rule of law.<\/p><\/li><\/ul>","hash":"fca5774f669803887558f1f8bf49f8ba6cbad35f9de48a9f1720f5619f212128","available":"0","settings":{"layout":"linklist","size":"default","showanalysts":"-1","showcompanies":"-1","synopsislength":"-1","showcountries":"-1","showcurrencies":"-1","synopsisexpand":"0","nodate":"0","notitle":"0","dateformat":"d M G:i","nolinktitle":"0","noproduct":"0","noflags":"0","shownav":"0","oldestedition":"","limit":"1"}}]

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